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INTRODUCTION
This Article demonstrates theoretical foundations of Islamic
finance and their correlation with the Islamic finance industry. In this
respect, the Article presents an overall survey of the Islamic finance
industry, Islamic-law injunctions pertaining to Islamic finance,
quasi-regulatory institutions, financial engineering, transaction
structures, and evolving practices. The Article also highlights various
areas of further research, a comprehensive treatment of which is
critical to the continuing growth of Islamic finance in the
international financial markets.
Introducing the Islamic financial services ("IFS") industry, this
Article outlines the theoretical framework of Islamic finance and its
correlation with Islamic law, and discusses the processes of law-
making in Islam, which is significant in understanding the limitations
and process of innovative growth in the IFS industry. Part I of the
Article briefly traces the modem history of Islamic finance. Parts II
and III discuss the sources and functioning of Islamic law and their
impact on contemporary Islamic finance. Part IV illustrates the
significant prohibitions to be observed by Islamic finance, that is,
injunctions to avoid interest-based and excessively speculative
transactions. Part V seeks to demonstrate how the theoretical
framework of Islamic finance exists today in the IFS industry. With a
conclusion to follow, Part VI includes a summary of various
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
financial services that the IFS industry offers and includes a brief
description of contemporary Islamic finance transactions.
I. WHAT IS ISLAMIC FINANCE?
In common parlance, Muslims' financial operations and interest-
free banking qualify for defining the expression "Islamic finance."
Technically, however, the definition goes beyond the common
understanding.' It includes the avoidance of interest or usury, which
is generally referred to and known as riba or "unjustified increase,"2
and the avoidance of ambiguity, which is generally referred to and
known as gharar or excessive "uncertainty, risk [or] speculation."3
Islamic finance also means to earn in a religiously permissible way
(halal), "and more generally the quest for justice, and other ethical
and religious goals."4
Among others, two salient features provide a general defining
guidance-namely, the philosophy of risk sharing and the promotion
of social and economic welfare. The risk sharing philosophy
considers the predetermined and fixed interest rate to be unilaterally
exploitative on the borrower and, alternatively, suggests a profit and
loss sharing arrangement between the creditor and the debtor. The
welfare philosophy takes objectives of an enterprise beyond profit
maximization.'
Although Islamic finance "fell into relative disuse during the
colonial period," between the eighteenth century and the mid-
twentieth century, Muslims now seek to regain their identity by way
of rebuilding their own institutions, including financial institutions.6
1. IBRAHIM WARDE, ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1-2 (2000)
(noting the diversification of Islamic finance from fourteen centuries of practice).
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Yousf Talal DeLorenzo, The Religious Foundations of Islamic Finance, in
ISLAMIC FINANCE: INNOVATION AND GROWTH 9, 9-10 (Simon Archer & Riffat
Ahmed Abdel Karim eds., 2002).
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A. HISTORY OF ISLAMIC FINANCE: ISSUES OF MUSLIMS'
POLITICAL IDENTITY
Pakistani scholars led the intellectual debate favoring the
feasibility of an Islamic financial system in the 1940s. Certain
political and economic developments, such as "the advent of pan-
Islamism and the rise in oil prices," facilitated moving theory toward
practice.7 Early on, Egypt championed this vision in Muslim
countries. Saudi Arabia and other countries reinforced it later. The
Arab-Israeli conflict fueled the momentum, which saw its climax in
the form of the Organization of the Islamic Conference ("OIC") that
was established in 1970.8 From its inception, the OIC was involved
in planning Islamic monetary and financial systems. At its fourth
summit held in Pakistan in 1974, the OIC resolved to create the
Islamic Development Bank ("IDB").9 In 1979, Pakistan began full
Islamization of its banking sector, the first country to do so. 10
Furthermore, heightened political slogan in the Arab world gave
birth to what we may consider as the partial economic justification
7. WARDE, supra note 1, at 74.
8. Id.; see SHAHRUKH RAFI KHAN, PROFITS AND Loss SHARING: AN ISLAMIC
EXPERIMENT IN FINANCE AND BANKING 7-12 (1987) (outlining the political and
economic background of Islamic finance).
9. WARDE, supra note 1, at 75.
The [IDB] is a Multilateral Development Bank serving the Muslim countries.
Its present membership stands at [fifty-five] countries. Its purpose is to foster
economic development and social progress of member countries and Muslim
communities, individually and collectively, in accordance with the principles
of [Islamic law]. In order to meet the growing and diverse needs of its
member countries, the Bank has established a number of institutions and
funds with distinct administrative arrangements and operational rules. These
entities and funds, affiliated with the Bank, enable the IDB to mobilize
supplementary financial resources in line with [Islamic law] and to focus on
those functions and activities, which cannot be covered under its normal
financing arrangements. With these affiliated entities and funds, the Bank has
evolved over time into a group called the IDB Group. During the span of
about three decades of existence, the Bank has made significant strides. The
Bank has not only successfully attained a respectable position among the
multilateral development financing institutions, but also proved to be a model
emulated by other Islamic banks.
Id.; PHILIP MOLYNEUX & MUNAWAR IQBAL, BANKING AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN
THE ARAB WORLD 156 (2005).
10. WARDE, supra note 1, at 77.
20081 665
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for the existence of the IFS industry. Muslim organizations exerted
political pressure on the governments of Muslim countries, including
those with a known secular manifesto, to encourage Islamic-law-
compatible financial products.'1 Although Muslim organizations
continued to expand throughout the Muslim world, the 1980s showed
relatively moderate enthusiasm for Islamic banking. After the 1991
Gulf War, Kuwait was quick to announce the creation of Kuwait
Finance House, the country's sole Islamic bank.' 2
The quadrupling petrol price hike during the middle of 1970s-a
"petrodollar windfall"-contributed to "Islamic solidarity."' 3
However, in subsequent years, due to the increasing political tussle
among Arab states, the majority of petrodollars were invested in the
United States either in the form of defense contracts or deposits in
U.S. banks. 4
From the 1990s onwards, Islamic banking and finance grew
rapidly. Between 1996 and 1997, Islamic financial institutions grew
at an average rate of twenty-five percent and held assets exceeding
USD $200 billion. 5 Currently, the Islamic finance market may
exceed USD $350 billion with a present growth rate of fifteen
percent. 16
It appears from the above that the political resurgence has been a
constant pressure on the demand for Islamic finance unlike the less
constant petrodollar windfall. Since over seventy percent of the IFS
11. Id. at 105 (pointing out that Muslim countries amended banking laws to
promote Islamic finance).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 92-93. See generally KHAN, supra note 8, at 7 (suggesting that the
new wealth of Muslim countries allowed the promotion of Islamic sentiment and
pride among its citizens, which had been dormant before the 1970s).
14. WARDE, supra note 1, at 92-95.
15. WARDE, supra note 1, at 1. But see MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at
148-49 (noting that during the 1990s the growth rate was slower in comparison to
the fifteen percent growth rate of the 1980s, but generally considering the 1990s
period to be the "most important" because Islamic banking "matured during this
time into a viable alternative financial intermediation model").
16. See Jay Collins, The Road Ahead for Islamic Finance, in INTEGRATING
ISLAMIC FINANCE INTO THE MAINSTREAM: REGULATION, STANDARDIZATION AND
TRANSPARENCY 197, 197 (S. Nazim Ali ed., 2007).
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industry is based on consumer financing," the prevailing demand
appears to be from the Muslim middle class-and not from the
petrodollars reserves. 8 However, some scholars have argued that
Islamic finance continues to grow more from the supply side than
from the demand side.' 9
B. ISLAMIC ECONOMICS
In the wake of nationalized economies in the post-colonized
Muslim countries, Islamic finance emerged as a movement to
Islamize those economies. The discipline, therefore, was known
earlier as Islamic economics. Although the discipline "was initially
conceived as an independent Islamic social science, it quickly lost
the emphasis on independence and ...[,] once researchers started
using conventional economics tools, their discipline was quickly
subsumed by the larger field of economics. ' z
Under official patronage by various Muslim countries, the scholars
of Islamic economics mainly emphasized, inter alia, converting
interest-based revenue generation to Islamic modes of financing.2'
17. Walid Hegazy, Fatwas and the Fate of Islamic Finance: A Critique of the
Practice of Fatwa in Contemporary Islamic Financial Markets, in ISLAMIC
FINANCE: CURRENT LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 133, 147-48 (S. Nazim Ali
ed., 2005).
18. See WARDE, supra note 1, at 86 (noting that firms such as Citicorp and
Merrill Lynch have established subsidiaries in Islamic countries to provide services
and products tailored toward the Islamic middle class).
19. See MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PRACTICE 190 (2006) (arguing that "jurists who participate actively in Shari'a
arbitrage help[] to expand the industry's customer base through indirect
advertisements [such as] conferences and publications ...as well as religious
admonishment that Muslims should avoid conventional finance").
20. Id. at 138. Even though Islamic economics researchers used conventional
economic tools "mimicking the (interest based) conventional finance it set out to
replace[,] ... writings in Islamic jurisprudence, Islamic economics, and Islamic
finance continued to assert that the conventional interest-based banking and
finance is... forbidden .. . ." Id.
21. See generally WORKSHOP ON ISLAMIZATION OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM,
IIIE's BLUEPRINT OF ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SYSTEM INCLUDING STRATEGY FOR THE
ELIMINATION OF RIBA: REPORT OF THE IIIE WORKSHOP ON THE ISLAMIZATION OF
FINANCIAL SYSTEM MAY-JUNE 1997, at 104-09 (1999) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT]
(pointing out that banks will initially act as intermediaries in the transfer of funds,
but will eventually be replaced by new agency-based financial institutions to
2008]
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Islamic banking thus appeared as an offshoot of Islamic economics.
On a small scale, however, Islamic banking started after World War
II, at the early days of post-colonization. It started on the basis of
theoretical Islamic finance works that were authored in the early
nineteenth century in response to the significant Muslim majority
who refrained from participating in modem, interest-based
commercial banks.22
C. ISLAMIC FINANCE TODAY
The International Association of Islamic Banks requires every
financial institution offering Islamic financial services to have a
board of Islamic law scholars directly elected by shareholders.23 In
theory, the Sharia (Islamic law) board can review any product
proposal for its validation or otherwise. If the board refuses to
validate a product proposal because of noncompliance with
principles of Islamic finance, financial institutions are left with no
option but to abandon the proposal. 24 However, some scholars have
found instances of "rubber stamping" managerial decisions by the
board.25
facilitate the elimination of interest while continuing to process settlements of
financial obligations).
22. MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at 147. Credit and cooperative societies
remained functional within the colonized Muslim world to offer interest-free
financial solutions at a limited scale, but proper Islamic banking institutions started
emerging during 1960s. Id.
23. WARDE, supra note 1, at 226.
[A Shariah Board] is formed of a number of members chosen from among
jurists and men of Islamic Jurisprudence and of comparative law who have
conviction and firm belief in the idea of Islamic Banks. To ensure freedom of
initiating their opinion the following are taken into account: (a) They must not
be working as personnel in the bank. That means: They are not subject to the
authority of the board of directors. (b) They are appointed by the general
assembly as it is the case of the auditors of accounts. (c) The general
assembly fixes their remunerations. (d) The Legitimate Control Body has the
same means and jurisdictions as the auditors of accounts.
Id. at 226-27 (quoting AHMAD MUHAMMAD ABD AL-AZIZ NAJJAR, ONE HUNDRED
QUESTIONS AND ONE HUNDRED ANSWERS CONCERNING ISLAMIC BANKS 20
(1980)).
24. Id. at 227.
25. Id.
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In order to standardize the regulation of the IFS industry, the
governments of various Muslim countries and the industry took
many initiatives. Malaysia established a National Syariah (Sharia)
Board to standardize Islamic finance practices and advise the
Malaysian Central Bank.26 Pakistan also established a Sharia Board
within the State Bank of Pakistan to achieve similar objectives, and
the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and others followed suit. In
general, a special regulatory regime governs the IFS industry in
Muslim countries and a different regime continues to regulate
conventional banking.27 Muslim countries thus have a dual regulatory
system catering to both Islamic and conventional banks.2"
As for industry-oriented, non-governmental initiatives, advisory
bodies were established including the "Institute of Islamic
Research... at Al-Azhar University (established in Cairo, 1961), the
Islamic Jurisprudence Council... of the Muslim World League
(established in Makka, 1979), the Fiqh Academy ... of the
Organization of Islamic Conference (established in Jeddah, 1984)."19
Although it does not play any formal role of regulating the IFS
industry, the practices of the IDB are adopted as industry standards.30
Industry-sponsored bodies include the Accounting and Auditing
Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions,3 the Islamic Financial
26. Id. at 229-30.
27. MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at 162.
28. Id. at 162-63.
29. EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 32.
30. See RODNEY WILSON, ISLAMIC FINANCE 61-63 (1997).
In the long term, the future of the IDB will depend on political developments
as much as financial conditions. If the economies of the Muslim world move
away from western secularism, the 1DB may become even more important.
Much will depend on the future in the Gulf region, especially in Saudi Arabia,
but certainly during the last decade events seem to have been moving towards
greater application of the Shariah law as Islamists win more political and
economic influence.
Id. at 63.
31. See MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at 149 (explaining that the role of
the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions
includes "adapting . . . international standards to suit Islamic financial
institutions"); Official Website of Accounting and Auditing Organization for
Islamic Financial Institutions [AAOIFI], http://www.aaoifi.com/ (last visited Mar.
6, 2008).
2008] 669
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Services Board,32 the International Islamic Financial Market, 33 the
Liquidity Management Center,34 and the International Islamic Rating
Agency.35
Despite the emergence of the above institutions, no single
institution could be regarded as the central point of reference for
guidance on the issues of compliance with Islamic law. Therefore,
the central role of the Sharia Board of each IFS institution continues
to drive the bulk of industry innovation. However, opinions from Al-
Azhar University, the Islamic Jurisprudence Council of the Muslim
World League, and the Fiqh Academy of the Organizational Islamic
Conference have been decisive on various controversial transactional
issues.36 If an IFS institution has launched a product relying on the
opinion of its Sharia board or any of the above institutions,
competitor IFS institutions invariably adopt the same structure,
implicitly confirming the structure's validity and encouraging its
broad adoption.37  The industry-oriented, non-governmental
institutions and the internal Sharia boards of IFS institutions, in
effect, collectively act as a quasi-regulatory body.
D. PRODUCT DESIGNING AND EFFICIENCY
The trend of relying on earlier juristic sources has led the IFS
industry to borrow classical contract forms that resemble
32. See MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at 150 (noting that the primary role
of the Board is to include prudential regulation for the Islamic financial
institutions); Official Website of Islamic Financial Services Board,
http://www.ifsb.org (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
33. See MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at 149-50 (arguing that
International Islamic Financial Market provides much needed market liquidity
"due to the absence of a secondary market for Islamic financial instruments");
Official Website of International Islamic Financial Market, http://www.iifin.net
(last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
34. See MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at 150 (explaining that the Center
was established as an arm of the International Islamic Financial Market with a
view toward efficiently managing the short term liquidity needs of the IFS
institutions).
35. See id. at 150-51 (explaining that the Agency supplements the conventional
rating industry by rating the Islamic-law compliance of IFS products).
36. EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 32.
37. See id. at 11-13 (describing the process by which Islamic financial
institutions create and adopt financial products and services).
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conventional financial transactions. The classical contract names are
retained to portray the brand name of Islamic finance, as well as to
create an independent identity.3" These names are used for the
equivalent conventional transactions, which include, for example,
using "ijara" for "lease," "murabaha" for "cost-plus sale," and
"takaful" for "insurance." To initiate the product-designing or
reengineering process, jurists are assisted by lawyers and bankers.
The group collectively examines the short-listed conventional
products and in the process removes the transactional steps that
violate Islamic law and replaces them with those that are in
compliance.39 The Sharia boards, therefore, play an important role in
the development of Islamic finance products. They also indirectly
market the product by giving presentations at various conferences
where professionals from the IFS industry are in attendance.4 ° When
more than one institution offers a product, competition reduces the
profits and results in greater innovation.4'
The number of Islamic finance scholars today is small. The same
jurists serve on the boards of various IFS institutions, provide expert
testimonies before the quasi-regulatory bodies of the IFS industry,
and assist in shaping policy opinions and quasi-regulatory
frameworks for the IFS industry.42
Scholars have argued that approximating conventional transactions
with the help of transaction formats developed and used centuries
ago by Muslim jurists may increase the risk of mispricing and
inefficiency. Bundling of risks was offered as an alternative, while
highlighting the dangers of an approximation strategy.43 In the long
38. Id. at 18-19.
39. Id. at 11-12.
40. Id. at 11.
41. Id. at 11-13.
42. Id. at 32.
43. Id. at 23.
[T]he use of premodern contract forms in Islamic finance essentially
reentangles the various risks, for example, by allowing an increase in price
due to embedded options, while disallowing sale of those options
separately .... [A]dherence to classical nominate contracts necessarily
amplifies the aforementioned tension between efficiency and credibility
directions: 1. Classical conditions of nominateobjectives. This, in turn, must
force the industry to choose one of two contracts may be systematically
20081
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term, the suggestion is to revive the substances-and not merely the
form--of classical jurisprudence and the economic or best-benefit
analyses that the classical jurists developed: the objective of
enhancing economic efficiency.44 The inefficiency caused by the use
of classical contract forms is tolerable only if the spirit and substance
of Islamic law is ensured.45
Contrary to the aforementioned inefficiency observation on
contemporary Islamic finance, a scholar has argued that Islamic
finance-which is derived from divine commands--enhances
efficiency despite its paternalistic nature.46 In support, the scholar
describes the standard prisoners' dilemma and maintains that the
divine command-"thou shalt not defect"-could yield mutual
cooperation among the market participants, instead of mutual
defection resulting in inefficiency.47
relaxed to enhance efficiency, in which case they would have served no
purpose. ... [The risks of this approach include that] the target audience of
Islamic finance may grow progressively more disenchanted by the lip service
it pays to classical texts, without adhering to the conditions therein.... [Or],
2. Islamic finance may continue to be an inefficient replication of
conventional finance, always one step behind developments in the imitated
sector.
Id. at 23-25.
44. Id. at 26-29 (outlining the established criteria for best benefit analyses,
namely: "(1) allowing apparent benefit, (2) preventing apparent loss/harm, (3)
preventing means of circumventing the law, and (4) consideration of specific
circumstances in time and place").
45. Id. at 54-55.
This inefficiency would be tolerable only if we ensure that the spirit of the
Law that gave rise to adopted forms is protected .... [I]t would be shameful
merely to copy or adapt inefficient historical forms and squander the
substance of Islamic law. Ideally, contemporary jurists would develop a
modem jurisprudence that embodies the substance of premodem law within
the context of contemporary legal and regulatory frameworks.
Id.
46. Id. at 9 ("[Judge Richard] Posner denounced Adam Smith's support for
laws against interest-based borrowing and lending as patemalistic and efficiency
reducing.").
47. Id. at 9-10.
Within the quasi-religious context of Islamic jurisprudence and finance, there
is no doubt that religious injunctions are by definition paternalistic. Indeed,
the charge of "paternalism" sounds compassionate when attributed to the
Divine and therefore will not be contested. With regard to efficiency
[23:661
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II. THE ORIGIN AND SOURCES OF ISLAMIC
FINANCE
A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ISLAMIC FINANCE
The Prophet Mohammad was a merchant and a trader; trade and
commerce traditions are not new to Islam.4" Consistent with the
history of Muslims' entrepreneurial business and financial
transactions, Muslims today continue to explore commercial
opportunities in accordance with the dictates of their beliefs.49
reduction, consider the following simple and well-known example, which
suggests that paternalistic injunctions against dealings to which parties
mutually consent can in fact be efficiency-enhancing.
Player 2
Player 1 Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 4,4 0,5
Defect 5,0 1,1
In the standard two-prisoners' dilemma shown [above], each player has a
choice to cooperate or defect, with the shown payoffs (the first payoff in each
cell is for the row player, and the second is for the column player). For each
of the two players, the dominant strategy, regardless of the opponent's choice,
is to defect (and get [five] instead of [four], or [one] instead of [zero],
depending on opponent's action). Thus, the unique Nash equilibrium (wherein
each player plays the best response to the other's selected action) is defection
for both players, whereby hereby each player would receive [one].
In this well-known game, it is very clear that the equilibrium outcome of the
prisoner's dilemma, to which players will gravitate if left to their own
devices, is inefficient. Mutual cooperation would yield [four] for each, instead
of [one]. In this case, a paternalistic divine command 'thou shalt not defect'
can in fact be efficiency enhancing.
Id.
48. WARDE, supra note 1, at 38.
49. See DeLorenzo, supra note 6, at 9-10 (outlining the history of the Islamic
finance and its continuing evolution to adapt to the changing nature of global
business).
Islamic business in history is an exotic and dynamic panorama that ranges
from gem merchants in Ceylon, to caravan traders in Mali, to dealers of
saffron in Muslim Spain, to sellers of aromatic oils in the deserts of Arabia, to
colourful cotton markets in Turkey, to spice markets in India, to the hardwood
merchants of Malaysia, to the plantations and industry of Indonesia, to
carpetmakers in Kashmir, to the great merchant houses of the Levant, to the
oil of the Arabian Penninsula, North Africa, and Brunei. The business
practices and ethics in all of these places, and from the moment that Muslims
6732008]
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According to Islam, religious scriptures guide Muslims as to their
inter se anthropomorphic relationship, dealings with the nature, and
the material aspect of the world.5" Notwithstanding emphasis on
property rights in Islam, Muslims believe that everything belongs to
God (Allah), a monotheistic being, and humankind is simply a
caretaker.5 Property rights and freedom of trade by mutual consent
are central to Islam.52
As caretaker, humankind is strictly accountable for its stewardship
of creation in return for benefiting from and exercising authority over
the physical universe.53 Humankind must endeavor to abide by
approved behavior and refrain from the disapproved. Doing "good"
covers all the activities of a believer.54 Seeking the permissible
(halal) and avoiding the forbidden (haram) in all the pursuits of life
is an overarching duty of a Muslim." This leads to a jurisprudential
examination of the religious scriptures primarily to understand and
act according to the permissible (halal) framework and to avoid what
is forbidden (haram). This jurisprudential study took the form of a
discipline known as "Islamic jurisprudence" or "Islamic law"
(Sharia). In general, Islamic law extends to the understanding of a
believer's rights and obligations vis-A-vis God, humankind, and the
universe at large. 6
Since Islamic law treats a person's wealth and life on equal
footing, deprivation of wealth--or enrichment at someone else's
expense through the use of a forbidden means-is viewed with
arrived there, are derived from the same source. Modem Islamic finance and
investing came from the same tradition of open but disciplined markets where
risk and reward are tempered by clearly articulated religious precepts.
Id. at 13.
50. Id. at 11.
51. Id.; see WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW
19-20 (2005) (explaining the Muslim belief in God and comparing it to that of
Judaism and Christianity).
52. EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 9.
53. DeLorenzo, supra note 6, at 11.
54. THE HOLY QUR'AN: ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE MEANINGS AND
COMMENTARY 23:51 (1994) [hereinafter QUR'AN] ("0 ye messengers! enjoy (All)
things good and pure, And work righteousness: For I am well-acquainted With
(all) that ye do.").
55. DeLorenzo, supra note 6, at 12-13.
56. Id.atIO-11.
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strong disapproval.57 Economic progress is generally linked to risk,
which is essential for all innovations. 8 Put differently, bona fide,
fair, equivocal, and risk-sharing transactions are the hallmark of
Islamic finance. Furthermore, in the business dealings, Islamic law
enjoins to fulfill contractual obligations and honor commitments.5 9
Unfair dealings and advantages are exploitative and unjust tactics;
others include interest charged on money loans, ambiguous contracts,
monopolies, and price fixing.60 As discussed in Part VI below, it
remains to be examined empirically whether the IFS industry is in
compliance with the injunctions.
B. FORMATION OF LEGAL AUTHORITY
Being revealed by God, through the Prophet Muhammad, the
Quran is the first primary source of Islamic law and the principal
guide for interpretation. 6' Oral and practice-based Prophetic
traditions are the second primary source of Islamic law.62 This
Article will focus on only some of the sources of Islamic law: the
Quran, the Prophetic traditions, consensus of juristic opinion, and
juristic or analogical reasoning.
In general, the sources in Islamic law may be categorized as
revealed and non-revealed. 63 The Quran is the first revealed source.
Being the word of God in its letter and spirit, the Quran is
communicated through the Prophet Muhammad. "[A]ll that is
narrated from the Prophet, his acts, his sayings and whatever he has
tacitly approved" (the "Prophetic traditions") represent the second
57. See id. at 17 (quoting the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH): "A persons wealth
is as sacred as a person's blood").
58. Id. at 23.
59. QUR'AN, supra note 54, at 5:1 ("0 ye who believe! Fulfil (all)
obligations."); see DeLorenzo, supra note 6, at 14 (quoting the Prophet
Mohammad (PBUH): "Muslims honour their covenants").
60. DeLorenzo, supra note 6, at 15.
61. HALLAQ, supra note 51, at 33-34.
62. Id. at 49 ("[T]he process that ultimately led to the emergence of Prophetic
Sunna as an exclusive substitute for sunan was a long one, and passed through a
number of stages before its final culmination as the second formal source of the
law after the Quran.").
63. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 1
(3rd ed. 2003).
2008]
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
revealed source6 4 because the Quran declared the Prophet's acts,
sayings, and tacit approvals to be divinely inspired. 65 Both revealed
sources are considered primary.66 In contrast, non-revealed sources
were developed by Islamic law scholars, and represent the
"methodology and procedural guidelines to ensure correct utilization
[sic]" of the revealed sources.67 Such sources include consensus of
juristic opinion, analogical or juristic reasoning, previously revealed
laws, legal opinions from companions of the Prophet
("companions"), equitable considerations, public interest, customs,
presumptions of continuity, and blocking the means to evil.68 All of
the secondary sources derive their authority in the Quran, the
Prophetic traditions, or both.
1. The Quran
At the beginning, Prophet Muhammad preached "for humility,
generosity and belief in God," and the Quranic commandments were
revealed subsequently, a period that is viewed as a beginning of
"substantive legislation."69 As for the Quranic text, it was recorded
and confirmed during the lifetime of the Prophet. It is believed to
have come down without sustaining any doubt as to the authenticity
of its text.7" The Quran was revealed in the course of twenty-three
years from 610 through 632 C.E. 71 Legal injunctions in the Quran are
64. Id. at 58.
65. QUR'AN, supra note 54, at 53:3-4; KAMALI, supra note 63, at 18-19, 63,
484 (discussing the differences between manifest revelation (the Qur'an) and
internal revelation (the Prophetic Tradition)).
66. C.G. WEERAMANTRY, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 32-39 (1988).
67. KAMALI, supra note 63, at 1.
68. See generally id. at 228-409 (outlining the methods of interpretation of
revealed sources).
69. HALLAQ, supra note 51, at 19-21.
70. See KAMALI, supra note 63, at 78 (noting that none of the Qur'an "consists
of conceptual transmission, that is, transmission in the words of the narrator
himself. Both the concepts and the words of the Qur'an have been recorded and
transmitted as the Prophet received them").
71. MUHAMMAD KHALID MASUD ET AL., Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal
Interpretation, in ISLAMIC LEGAL INTERPRETATION: MUFTIS AND THEIR FATWAS 3,
4 (Muhammad Khalid Masud et al. eds., 1996) ("Muhammed received the first
676 [23:661
THE RISE OF CUSTOMARYBUSINESSES
scattered in its various chapters and are not specific to any particular
chapter. Verses containing the injunctions constitute a small portion
of what is a compilation of 6,235 verses.72 The injunctions include
matters related to family law, inheritance, and criminal punishments.
In its narrative style, the Quran's ratiocinative explanations to the
injunctions provide guidance for understanding the injunctions in a
broader spectrum. By addressing itself to the conscience of an
individual, the Quran seeks to use its narrative style convincingly.
While doing so, it expresses its "purpose, reason, objective, benefit,
reward and advantage of its injunctions. 73 However, while some of
the Quranic expressions are definitive in their application and leave
no room for further interpretation, some are open to multiple
understandings.74 Islamic law has developed a comprehensive set of
rules that identify such scope.75 The multiplicity of meanings is
mainly due to the Quran's variation in grammatical use of language,
which profoundly enlarges the scope of investigation on any given
topic. 76 Resolving ambiguity in injunctions from the primary sources
requires assistance from other Quranic verses and, if no help is found
there, from the Prophetic traditions.77 From the array of secondary
sources, interpreting, deriving meanings, restricting, and enlarging
the scope of an injunction are various forms of juristic efforts that
seek to understand the Quranic injunctions in light of the changing
social conditions.
revelation, Sura 96 ('The Blood Clot'), in the year 610, and the last revelation,
verse 176 of Sura 4 ('Women') shortly before his death in 632.").
72. KAMALI, supra note 63, at 17. The legal injunctions in the Quran comprise
about five hundred verses; however, some have argued that the number is eighty.
See ABDUR RAHMAN I. Doi, SHARI'AH: THE ISLAMIC LAW 7 (1984) (counting five
hundred verses); N.J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 12 (1964) (counting
eight verses).
73. KAMALI, supra note 63, at 27.
74. See id. at 27-44 (discussing "definitive" and "speculative" approaches to
Quaranic interpretation).
75. Id. at 44-55.
76. See generally id. at 117-86 (outlining the means of interpretation of the
Quran through a close examination of language and grammatical structure).
77. Dol, supra note 72, at 7.
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2. The Prophetic Traditions (Sunnah)
The Quran declared the Prophetic traditions to be followed.7" The
Prophet made a conscious effort to separate the word of God from
his own by initially discouraging his companions from recording his
life and practices so that there would be no confusion about the text
of the Quran.79 The Prophetic traditions were compiled more
comprehensively after his lifetime. Differences in the text and
transmission of the Prophetic traditions ensued, laying the foundation
for its scientific study. Even though the Quran remains the first
primary source and supersedes the Prophetic traditions, authenticity
in text and transmission elevates injunctions arising out of the
Prophetic traditions to the same level as that of the Quranic
injunctions. However, no more than ten such Prophetic traditions rise
to this level."0 As for the status of Prophetic traditions vis-A-vis the
Quranic text, they mainly consist of three categories. The Prophetic
traditions confirm and reiterate, explain and clarify, or comprise
independent rulings that cannot be traced back to the Quran.8 1 In
developing the scientific study of the Prophetic traditions and
acceptance of its text in legal reasoning, Islamic law prescribes a
number of categories, classifications, and conditions to offer a
systematic analysis.8" These stipulations help refine the juristic
analysis toward finding a solution from this second primary source.
From the many, six collections of the Prophetic traditions are
regarded as most authentic-considering both in Sunni and Shiite
schools, the total comes to twelve. 3 Amongst all of the Sunni school
collections, two are considered the most authentic due the strict
78. KAMALI, supra note 63, at 63-65.
79. Id. at 77-78.
80. Id. at 95.
81. Id. at 81-87.
82. See id. at 58-111 (outlining the main features of the jurisprudential
standards for the acceptance of the Prophetic traditions).
83. MOHD. HAMEEDULLAH KHAN, THE SCHOOLS OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 25-27 (1991) (explaining that authenticity of a tradition is
determined through a grading system based on the number of persons relating the
tradition and the acceptance of the tradition by early companions; this grading
system is further tested by classifying the character of the narrator).
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standards the collectors employed during their compilation. 84 The
total number of the Traditions in the two most authentic compilations
of the Sunni school is about 10,000, which includes a significant
number of Traditions that relate to trade, business, and other
financial transactions.
3. Consensus of Juristic Opinions (Ijma)
In absence of any explicit guidance from the Quran and the
Prophetic traditions, legal injunctions are derived through a
unanimous consensus of juristic opinion (the "Consensus"). The
Consensus is not directly revealed and this source of Islamic law is
arrived at through rational proof 5 In theory, the Consensus can only
occur after the Prophet's lifetime.86 Consensus develops from
toleration of a plurality of juristic opinions until the diversity of
opinion merges to a consensus.87 Once established, the Consensus is
a binding authority itself-as its reliance on the primary sources is
no longer significant-and is not subject to repeal by another
Consensus.88
The status of the Consensus as a source is established using the
primary sources.8 9 There is agreement on the Consensus being a
source of Islamic law, but divergent views exist as to what qualifies
as Consensus.9" According to a classical definition, nothing less than
universal consensus of Muslim scholars (and not jurists-which may
84. Id. at 26.
85. KAMALI, supra note 63, at 228.
86. See id. at 231 (explaining that the Prophet was the highest authority during
his lifetime, therefore disagreement by others had no impact on his authority, and
Consensus was unnecessary).
87. Id.
88. See id. at 232, 235-36 (clarifying that although this is the majority rule,
some scholars believe that creating constituents may repeal the Consensus and
enact another).
89. See id. at 236-44 (discussing the textual support for Consensus in the
Quran and the Sunnah, but noting that some scholars argue that this textual
evidence does not amount to conclusive proof).
90. See id. at 228-60 (outlining the jurisprudential differences on the scope and
definition of the Consensus).
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be limited in number) would be binding.91 Some disagree, arguing
against restricting Consensus to a consensus of Muslim scholars, and
in favor of the consensus of Muslims at large, including laymen and
scholars.92 However, the majority of scholars have not agreed with
such views over the centuries. 93 Despite the existence of support for
the majority of jurists view-and not the genre of scholars-the
popular view favors the consensus of all jurists.94 Many prominent
scholars of Islamic law have recognized universal consensus to be
"totally unrealistic." 95 Due to the gap between the theory and practice
of Consensus, very few instances are available when Consensus was
achieved in its classical sense, and those instances are often restricted
to the time of the companions of the Prophet and not thereafter.
96
Some recent scholars of Islamic law assert that Consensus did not
receive scholarly attention as much as the science of Prophetic
traditions, and consider the lack of such attention to be responsible
for the uncertainty as to what constitutes Consensus.97 By equating
the classical position on Consensus with utopia, scholars have
suggested its institutionalization in the form of a legislative body. 98
4. Juristic and Analogical Reasoning (Ijtihad)99
One of the essential features of Islamic law is to achieve a
harmony between the revealed sources and reason. Juristic and
91. See id. at 233 (noting that even a single dissenting scholar would prohibit
the formation of Consensus).
92. Id.
93. See id. (clarifying the belief held by the majority that the Consensus can be
exercised by Muslim scholars, as they are representatives of the community).
94. See id. at 234 (discussing the qualifications jurists must possess to
participate in the Consensus). Specifically, jurists must qualify as upright
individuals, be clear of pernicious innovation and heresy, and be qualified to carry
out ijtihad. Id.
95. Id. at 229 (noting the existence of occasions where Consensus has been
claimed, despite the agreement of only a majority within a particular school or
beyond an individual school).
96. Id. at 228-29, 259-60.
97. Id. at 229.
98. Id. at 255-260.
99. Many scholars of Islamic law generally discuss Juristic Reasoning and
analogical reasoning separately as two independent sources. However, various
scholars do not recognize a difference beyond the nomenclature. Id. at 298.
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analogical reasoning ("Juristic Reasoning") is the main instrument
for achieving and maintaining the harmony between revealed and
non-revealed sources. 00 Juristic Reasoning is, therefore, one of the
prime sources of Islamic law.' 0' The scope of Juristic Reasoning is to
infer and extract meaning from the unclear text of revealed
sources. 0 2 It could either be exercised in the form of analogical
reasoning (qiyas) or in general.
Analogical reasoning seeks to extend an injunction "from an
original case... to new case, because the latter has the same
effective cause as the former."' 3 Put differently, it applies a textual
ruling available for a particular case to a different case for which
there is no textual ruling and the effective cause between both the
scenarios is the same. 104 One way of exercising Juristic Reasoning is
to discover a common effective cause from the primary sources of
the Quran and the Prophetic traditions, and apply it to a new set of
circumstances not expressly regulated by the sources."'
Encouraging Juristic Reasoning, a Prophetic tradition entitles a
jurist to a reward for his effort even though his conclusion is
incorrect; for a correct conclusion, a jurist is rewarded twice-once
for his efforts and again for reaching the correct conclusion.0 6
Arriving at an answer is inherently subjective to a jurist, and may
result into multiple opinions by the jurists. This generates a plurality
or divergence of opinions in Islamic law.0 7
100. Id. at 468.
101. See id. (explaining that the importance of ijtihad lies in the fact that it is a
continuous process, and can evolve with the "changing conditions of the Muslim
community in its aspirations to attain justice, salvation and truth").
102. Id. at 469.
103. Id. at 264.
104. Id.
105. This process resembles the common law principle of stare decisis or the
civil law principle of ratio legis. If a judge, distinguishing ratio decidendi from an
existing case, found that same ratio related to both cases, he would analogically
apply the decision of the earlier case to the facts of the new case. Id. at 299.
106. HALLAQ, supra note 52, at 130.
107. Id. at 130-32 (discussing the fact that although differences of opinion are
common, the opinions are not usually dramatically different).
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Exercising Juristic Reasoning remained popular until the ninth
century. 0 18 Thereafter, the number of jurists participating in the
exercise gradually fell. Owing to the decline of participation in
Juristic Reasoning, some scholars declared jurists extinct and
therefore disallowed any further exercise. This period in Islamic
history is known as the "closing of the door" of Juristic Reasoning
because scholars felt that "all essential questions" had been settled. 0 9
However, many maintain that the closure never took place, and that
the gate of Juristic Reasoning could not have been validly closed. " 0
A qualified jurist must possess profound scholarship and sharp
analytical skills."' According to the classical position, once these
conditions exist in someone, he or she is capable of exercising
Juristic Reasoning in all the fields where it is needed."2 A modem
view, however, is that Juristic Reasoning applies specifically to a
"collective effort" of experts in Islamic law and other disciplines." 3
This view is based on the premise that it is not possible for a single
person to possess knowledge of many disciplines with equal
command and mastery." 4
5. Islamic Law Resembling Common Law
Defining the Islamic lawmaking process, a notable scholar equated
Islamic jurists with common law judges:
Islamic finance thrives mainly in Islamic countries with officially adopted
civil laws, but it is driven primarily by a canon-law-like interpretation of
Islamic scriptures. However, one can readily see that the canon-like
108. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 70-71 (1982).
109. Id.
110. See generally KAMALI, supra note 63, at 468-97 (setting out the history and
jurisprudential development of the Juristic Reasoning).
111. See KAMALI, supra note 63, at 476-80 (outlining qualifications of a jurist to
include, among other requirements, a knowledge of (i) Arabic, (ii) the Quran and
the Prophetic traditions and their legal content, (iii) the Consensus and analogical
deduction, and (iv) the objectives of Islamic law); see also MASUD, supra note 71,
at 16-17 (summarizing the requisite skill set for a jurist).
112. KAMALI, supra note 63, at 480.
113. Id. at 496; see EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 31-32 (stating that
collaboration may provide authoritativeness to groups of jurists on modem
disciplines).
114. KAMALI, supra note 63, at 496.
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nature of Islamic jurisprudence is mostly rhetorical. The true nature of
Islamic jurisprudence of financial transactions is very similar to Western-
style common law. In particular, contemporary developments in Islamic
finance owe more to juristic understanding of the canonical texts and
previous juristic analyses than they owe to the canon itself." 5
C. SCHOOLS OF ISLAMIC LAW (MADHAHIB): JURISTIC REASONING
VERSUS ADOPTION OF SCHOOL
After the Prophet passed away, two main branches of Muslims
emerged during the time of his companions. The Sunni and Shiite
branches primarily diverged on political issues, but later each faction
developed its own jurisprudence. Since Islamic finance today is
flourishing mainly in the countries with Sunni jurisprudence, Shiite
Islamic finance practices are converging to Sunni transactional
structures." 6 Because of this convergence, this Article will only
discuss Islamic law and finance as viewed and interpreted by the
Sunni schools.
In the early history of Islam, Islamic law and legal studies evolved
through scholarly discussion circles led by learned men on various
issues.117 By the early part of the eighth century, such learned men
had their own circles and students, but the legal doctrine was still
115. EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 17.
It must be understood that when we claim that Islam has a satisfactory
solution for every problem emerging in any situation in all times to come, we
do not mean that the Holy Quran and [the Traditions] of the Holy Prophet or
the rulings of Islamic scholars provide a specific answer to each and every
minute detail of our socioeconomic life. [T]he Holy Quran and the Holy
[traditions] of the Prophet have laid down the broad principles in the light of
which the scholars of every time have deduced specific answers to the new
situations arising in their age. Therefore, in order to reach a definite answer
about a new situation, the scholars of [Islamic law] . . . have to analyze every
question in light of the principles laid down by the Holy Quran and [the
Prophetic traditions] as well as in the light of the standards set by earlier
jurists .... This ... ongoing process ... keeps injecting new ideas, concepts
and rulings into the heritage of Islamic jurisprudence.
Id. (quoting from a contemporary jurist).
116. See id. at 19-20 (noting, for instance, that Iran-a country with majority
Shiite population-has imitated the bond (sukuk) structure predominantly practiced
in regions of Sunni majority).
117. HALLAQ, supra note 51, at 153.
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incomplete.'18 Toward the end of the eighth century, various jurists
started developing legal assumptions and methodology and, with the
continued association of their respective circles, defended their
respective views on Islamic law.119 Students would attend circles in
various cities without owing loyalty to any doctrine. However, the
students joining a circle to teach would invariably teach what they
learned from their own teacher. 120 Toward the midst of ninth century,
various scholars were field specialists and leaders, had personal
followings, issued legal opinions, debated legal issues, and formed
doctrinal schools that represented a collective entity-as opposed to
a personal circle.2 ' Each school had its peculiar legal methodology
and positive principles, and was named after its founder. 22
Fifty years after the Prophet (670 C.E.) until the early eighth
century, two main schools emerged: those with a traditional
jurisprudential approach and others with rationalist jurisprudential
approach.12 The golden age of Islamic law began at this time and
lasted until the eleventh century with eight leading schools of Islamic
law (including four Shiite schools) emerging during the period. 124
The next three centuries witnessed juristic elaborations within the
established schools until the dark ages of Islamic law which began
when Baghdad fell to the Tatars in the thirteenth century. 2 ' In 1876,
the Ottomans' codification of the Hanafi jurisprudence rekindled
Islamic law, which was soon followed by various post-colonization
juristic revival movements in the twentieth century. 26
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 153-54.
121. Id. at 155.
122. Id. at 153-59.
123. EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 30-3 1.
124. Id.
125. Id. at31.
126. Id.
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Four Sunni schools comprising Hanaf,127 Maliki, 28 Shafi ,i,' 29 and
Hanbali3 ° flourished over the centuries and survive today. The
subsequent scholars in each school continued to enrich the school's
affiliated doctrine. When the pace of exercising Juristic Reasoning
slowed, Muslims, both laymen and scholars, followed the opinions of
any of the established schools.' 3 ' Each school has a substantial
following in various geographic regions of the Muslim world, and
the Muslims in such regions still abide by the school-specific
interpretations on issues pertaining to Islamic law. 3 2 As for
following a particular school, the general rule is that any person who
is not capable of performing Juristic Reasoning must follow someone
who is capable of doing so.' 33 Scholars who are not also jurists and
laymen should, therefore, refer to the opinions of a jurist. 3 4 Within
the Sunni schools of Islamic law, the choice is limited to above-
mentioned four schools.
III. OTHER FEATURES OF ISLAMIC FINANCE
A. ISLAMIC AND LEGAL OPINION (FATWA)' 35
Legal opinion played a central role in the emergence of the
modem day IFS industry in 1976 when an Islamic legal opinion was
introduced to extend the scope of cost-plus transactions. After that
opinion, cost-plus financing became the standard and mainstream
127. Founded by Imam Abu Hanifa An-Nu'man Ibn Thabit in Kufa, Iraq (699-
769 C.E.). KHAN, supra note 83, at 60-63.
128. Founded by Imam Malik Ibn Anas at Madina in Saudi Arabia (713-795
C.E.). Id. at 78-8 1.
129. Founded by Imam Muhammad Ibn Idris Ash-Shafi'i in Ghazza, Palestine
(767-820 C.E.). Id. at 94-95.
130. Founded by Imam Abu Abdullah Ahmad Ibn Muhammed Hanbal in
Baghdad, Iraq (780-855 C.E.). Id. at 110-11.
131. See id. at 137-38 (noting that these schools developed their own approach
to solve legal problems but share the same fundamental beliefs).
132. See, e.g., id. at 78 (explaining how the Maliki school spread into particular
regions, first into Egypt and later into other Arab countries).
133. HALLAQ, supra note 51, at 147.
134. Id.
135. See EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 32 (describing the concept offatwa as the
"elicitation of juristic response to a question, modeled after Roman system of
responsa").
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Islamic banking transaction, practiced now invariably by every
Islamic bank.136 This legal opinion was based on an opinion of a
classical Maliki jurist.1 3 A standard practice of seeking a legal
opinion ensued in the contemporary IFS industry.138
As mentioned, this now rich tradition of providing legal opinions
on issues of Islamic law started with the emergence of personal
scholarly circles in the eighth century. 39 The recipients of the legal
opinion were common people with questions pertaining to
application of Islamic law, politically appointed judges, and political
authorities including the caliph.4 ° The providers of legal opinion,
"jurisconsults" or mufti, were established scholars, and often leaders
of their own schools.' 4' No distinction between a jurist and a
jurisconsult explicitly existed; a jurisconsult was supposed to have
the same skill set as that of a jurist.'42 However, in latter periods of
some Sunni schools, jurisconsults tended to be lesser qualified and
would respond to questions only within the framework of his school
of Islamic law, by relying upon opinions of the jurists of his
school.'43 This trend continues to date.
Furthermore, a jurisconsult should be an exemplary moral figure,
should not practice contrary to the opinion he issues, and should not
contradict the doctrines of his own school.' Traditionally, the rules
applicable to an Islamic judge were equally applicable to
jurisconsults, including the necessity to display a dignified demeanor
and to avoid emotional expressions and favoritism.'45 Although a
136. Id. at 33.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. HALLAQ,upra note 51, at 153-55.
140. MASUD, supra note 71, at 4.
141. HALLAQ,supra note 51, at 153-55.
142. Wael B. Hallaq, Ifta' and Ijtihad in Sunni Legal Theory: A Development
Account, in ISLAMIC LEGAL INTERPRETATION: MUFTIS AND THEIR FATWAS 33, 33-
35 (Muhammad Khalid Masud et al. eds., 1996); see HALLAQ, supra note 51, at
147 (explaining that jurists and jurisconsults have similar qualifications,
educational backgrounds, and requirements for their respective profession).
143. HALLAQ, supra note 51, at 17.
144. Id.
145. See MASUD, supra note 71, at 22 (explaining that muftis or jurisconsults,
like judges, are required to treat the parties that come before them equally,
regardless of their adversarial nature or personal importance).
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jurisconsult is not generally required to set out his "methods of
reasoning,"' 146 the scope of his work is defined and restricted by the
question posed and the jurisconsult should respond accordingly. In
other words,
As [jurisconsults] must answer according to what is asked, their field of
response is largely determined by the formulation of the question. Since
the [jurisconsult] is not an investigator of the facts, these are taken as
given. In addition, while the issues involved ought to be ones that have
actually arisen and should not be purely hypothetical or
imaginary... questions are commonly posed in general terms, using the
names of fictional individuals.., or simply 'a man' or 'a woman.' Such
usage of generic descriptions and fictional names distances the query
from the particular evidential circumstances of the questioner. Yet in
many settings, the [jurisconsult] is confronted personally by the
questioner, whose name appears below the text of the question. In this
distinctive juxtaposition of the abstract and the actual, questions delimit
the [legal opinions] as a genre of legal response.147
Scholars have noticed anomalies in the current practice of
jurisconsults providing Islamic legal opinions to the IFS industry.
The IFS industry seeks to be regulated by the opinions of the
jurisconsults, who are remunerated by the respective IFS institutions,
either for their services as members of the Sharia supervisory board,
or as independent consultants.1 4 A recent analysis criticizes the
practice and finds it to be totally inconsistent with the established
classical position of Islamic law: a jurisconsult cannot be paid by the
person asking the question-other than payment of administrative
costs. 149 Remuneration of jurisconsult used to be from the
government. A conflict of interest exists in providing opinions in
matters where jurisconsults are remunerated, particularly on a pro
rata basis, and where opinions are linked to the success of the
product. The ensuing economic pressure on jurisconsults has resulted
in a widespread practice of circumventing tactics by relying upon
obscurely minority views in order to push through the contemplated
transactional structure. To avoid abuse of Islamic legal opinions,
146. Id. at 25.
147. Id. at 22-23.
148. Hegazy, supra note 17, at 133.
149. Id. at 136.
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experts have suggested separating the jurisconsult's role of a
transaction consultant from his duties as an auditor which require
him to ensure conformity with Islamic law. 5° Another notable
scholar has classified the trend of choosing permissive minority
opinions from the classical jurisprudence as part of "shari'a
arbitrage": finding the closest approximation to the conventional
financial practice and then "reengineering" the product to meet
Islamic law, to be sold to an Islamic-finance-based captive market. 5'
It appears that the financial and transactional teams do not share
comprehensive information with jurisconsults, resulting in opinions
based on limited information. 5 2 Although some questions have
addressed the integrity of the mechanism for rendering Islamic legal
opinions for the IFS industry, other questions remain to be answered.
These questions include the following: Is the scope of the opinions
determined and if so, how? What is the manner and procedure of
opinion-seeking? How much information is provided to and shared
with jurisconsults? Whether jurisconsults simply reiterate positions
of a particular school or actually engage in Juristic Reasoning?'53
Finally, How are such opinions reasoned?
Scholars have noted that public access to the processes of
obtaining a legal opinion is generally restricted.'54 However, once
150. See id. at 139 (comparing the dual role of auditor and consultant to the
professional conflicts of interest of accountants and auditors in the infamous Enron
scandal).
151. Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, Limits and Dangers of Shari'a Arbitrage, in
ISLAMIC FINANCE: CURRENT LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 115, 120 (S. Nazim
Ali ed., 2005).
152. See, e.g., EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 48 (noting that, with respect to the
two interlinked contracts used for a sale-repurchase transaction, "in Islamic
finance, jurists may be asked to validate each contract separately, without
explaining the entire financial structure for which they will be used").
153. Some contemporary jurisconsults have displayed the tendency of not
following their own school, but referring directly to the Quran and the Prophetic
traditions and, in effect, exercising Juristic Reasoning. See, e.g., Hegazy, supra
note 17, at 146 (explaining the complex and often conflicting pressures on
jurisconsults to issue opinions that balance traditional religious beliefs and
classical teachings with modem financial transactions).
154. See, e.g., EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 129 (discussing the structure of
Meyer's Shari'a Funds, an Islamic hedge fund, and noting lack of public
information about the fund's screening process).
[23:661
THE RISE OF CUSTOMARY BUSINESSES
announced publicly, a legal opinion rapidly facilitates replication of
the product design process. And, unlike their classical counterparts,
Islamic legal opinions today are no longer area-specific and have
become transnational with the increasing use of technology.1
55
B. RULES ON PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP, AND CONTRACTS
1. Property and Ownership
Classical Islamic law defines property as an object that "must
satisfy two conditions: (1) possibility of physical possession and (2)
having potential beneficial uses.' 5 6 According to this definition,
many scholars believe that commercial insurance violates Islamic
law, for the object of sale is excessively uncertain or ambiguous. 157
Classifications of property include valued or unvalued property
(defined as public property or "properties with non permissible
uses... [such as] wine and pork"), immovable or movable property,
and fungible or non-fungible property." 8 Each classification is
subject to detailed rules in the various schools of Islam. Such
differences of opinion include the eligibility of usufruct for sale or
lease, taking possession before reselling, deferred prices, and prepaid
forward sale.159
The classical view of ownership distinguished between total and
partial ownership-for example, property plus usufruct or ownership
of either. 160 Modem scholarship, however, treats ownership as a
"bundle of rights" that is distributable to a number of entities.' 61 This
distinction has lead to devising an Islamic bonds (sukuk) structure
155. See MASUD, supra note 71, at 31 (explaining that after being reproduced in
print, on radio, television and in book-length publications, fatwas are now
available electronically to an international audience).
156. EL-GAMAL, Supra note 19, at 36.
157. See, e.g., id. ("[l]f the object of an insurance contract were defined as
'security,' with its premium viewed as price, the contract may have to be deemed
valid. However, many jurists argued, 'security' does not qualify as an object of
sale, since it does not constitute a tangible good or service.").
158. Id. at 36-39.
159. Id. at 36-37.
160. Id. at 39.
161. Id.
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where the title of the transaction property, with its usufruct, is
transferred to a special purpose vehicle that deals with all the
subleases issued in respect of the property.
1 62
Possession of property that gives rise to liability is generally either
in the form of a trust or a guaranty arrangement. While in the
possession of a trustee, only damage to the property caused by the
trustee's negligence or transgression will result in liability for the
loss. 1 63 In contrast, a guarantor's possession implies liability for any
and all damages. 64 Liability and risk issues arising from these
distinctions have informed the practice of Islamic banking in dealing
with the deposits and cost-plus financing issues, discussed further
below.
2. Contract and Its Conditions
According to an Islamic legal maxim, the presumption of general
permissibility governs until the contrary is established by an
injunctive authority.' 65 This presumption is equally applicable to the
Islamic law of contract that is, and always has been, central to
Islamic finance. However, in the case of Islamic contracts, some
scholars have regarded permissibility to be based on appropriate
precedents, which in effect reverses the presumption. 166
Two basic types of contract exist in Islamic law: compensatory
and charitable.1 67 Compensatory contracts, in the category of mutual
dealings, are entered into by the parties for personal benefit.
Charitable contracts lean toward the worship category of injunctions,
and parties who enter into such contracts look to God for their
reward. For the mutual material benefits to be derived from
compensatory contracts, the parties are expected to agree on "value
162. Id. at 40.
163. Id. at 41.
164. Id.
165. See Munawar Iqbal & Tariqullah Khan, Introduction, in FINANCIAL
ENGINEERING AND ISLAMIC CONTRACTS 1, 2-3 (Munawar Iqbal & Tariquilah Khan
eds., 2005) (indicating that the "Doctrine of Universal Permissibility" allows
everything that is not clearly prohibited).
166. See EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 45 (noting the views of Ibn Taymiyya, a
leading jurist of the late classical age).
167. Iqbal & Khan, supra note 165, at 3.
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equivalence" of such benefits and should have access to all relevant
information to assess this value. The Islamic law of contract allows
parties to freely stipulate any conditions they deem expedient, as
long as express prohibitions are observed.'68 Put differently, Islamic
law of contract recognizes "party autonomy" in contracts that do not
fall into the exceptional category of the prohibited.
Mutual consent is the cardinal point of Islamic law of contract.
Supplementing mutual consent, classical jurisprudence enumerates
some "cornerstones" of a valid contract, which
pertain to (1) parties of the contract, who must be eligible to conduct the
contract, (2) contract language, and (3) object of the contract. A contract
was not considered concluded if any of its cornerstones were violated.
Conditions of contract conclusion may be grouped into conditions
pertaining to (I) contracting parties.. ., (2) contract language ....
(3) unity of contract session, and (4) permissibility of object for specific
contract.
A concluded financial contract was deemed valid if it avoided six main
factors: (1) ignorance about object, price, time period, and the like,
(2) coercion, (3) conditions contrary to a contract's nature ....
(4) unnecessary ambiguity in contract language, (5) encroachment on
others' property rights, and (6) unconventional conditions that benefit one
parry at the other's expense.' 69
IV. PROHIBITIVE INJUNCTIONS: RIBA (USURY
OR INTEREST ON MONEY LOANS) AND
EXCESSIVE UNCERTAINTY AND AMBIGUITY
(GHARAR)
A. INTRODUCING INJUNCTIONS ON RIBA
Broadly, there are two kinds of injunctions in Islamic law: one
pertaining to matters of worship and the other to mutual dealings
among people. 70  The general presumption for worship is
168. Id. at 3-4.
169. EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 42.
170. lqbal & Khan, supra note 165, at 2-3.
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impermissibility unless enjoined, whereas, in contrast, the default
rule of mutual dealing is permissibility unless prohibited.17' While
trade by mutual agreement is strongly recommended, taking undue
advantage of anyone and depriving him or her of property is strictly
prohibited in the Quran. 7 2 Accordingly, in any given mutual dealing,
rights of God, transacting parties, and third parties-society at
large-are involved and are required to be observed. Rights of God
include avoiding transactions that comprise riba (interest or usury),
excessive uncertainty (gharar), gambling (maysir), and other
activities prohibited by God through His revelation.'73 Rights of God,
moreover, are latently present in every matter of mutual dealing,
whereas such rights exist patently in matters of worship. 7 4 In sum,
matters of mutual dealings entail more freedom than restrictions.
This might assist in understanding that observing injunctions on
mutual dealings by Muslims is also a part of worship with
consequences in the Hereafter.
Broadly, Islamic legal injunction for financial transactions can be
examined in a "net benefit" analysis, or in view of four types of
activities:
(1) [B]eneficial ones that are apparently beneficial, (2) beneficial ones that
are not clearly beneficial, (3) harmful ones that are apparently harmful,
and (4) harmful ones that are not apparently harmful. No injunctions or
prohibitions are needed for the first and third types of activities, whereas
injunctions to perform the first type of acts, and prohibitions against the
fourth, are necessary. In this regard, the [Quranic] verses.., clearly
explained that drinking and gambling belong to the fourth category:
Humans may be lured by the apparent benefits and thus lose sight of the
greater harm.
171. Id.
172. QUR'AN, supra note 54, at 4:29 ("0 ye who believe! Eat not up your
property Among yourselves in vanities: But let there be amongst you Traffic and
trade By mutual good-will: Nor kill (or destroy) Yourselves: for verily Allah hath
been to you Most merciful!").
173. Iqbal & Khan, supra note 165, at 3.
174. See HUSAYN HAMID HASSAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
ISLAMIC LAW 9-10 (1997) (delineating the two major components of Islamic law:
dealing with transactions among people and dealing with people's relationships
with God); see also HUSAYN HAMID HASSAN, USUL AL-FIQH (1970).
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In the case of wine and gambling, the Qur'anic solution was complete
avoidance thereof, since those activities are not essential. In contrast,
transfers of credit and risk are at the heart of finance, without which an
economic system cannot function. The Islamic legal solution in this case
was to impose restrictions on the means of transferring credit and risk,
through prohibitions of riba [i.e., usury] and gharar [i.e., excessive
uncertainty and ambiguity] .... [T]he forbidden riba is essentially
"trading in credit," and the forbidden gharar is "trading in risk," as
unbundled commodities.
In other words, Islamic jurisprudence uses those two prohibitions to allow
only the appropriate measure of permissibility of transferring credit and
risk to achieve economic ends. As many observers and practitioners in
financial markets will testify, trading in credit and risk (perfected through
derivative securities) is as dangerous as twirling a two-edged sword.
Although those vehicles can be used judiciously to reduce risk and
enhance welfare, they can easily entice otherwise cautious individuals to
engage in ruinous gambling behavior. While financial regulators seek to
limit the scope of credit and risk trading to protect systemic failures,
Islamic jurisprudence introduces injunctions that aim also to protect
individuals from their own greed and myopia.
175
1. The Prohibition of Riba: Equitable Considerations and Issue of
Time Value
No single definition of riba exists in Islamic law. Scholars extend
its scope to an increase in the exchange of two counter-values, but
exclude the increased price of a credit sale-and therefore establish
the concept of time value for money. Put simply, while some
scholars do not accept any increase to be valid, some consider a
reasonable return to be justified. 176 Most recently, a scholar has
argued that equating the concepts of riba and interest is not
appropriate because "some forms of interest ... should not be
considered forbidden riba.' 77 Scholars who do not consider riba to
175. EL-GAMAL, Supra note 19, at 47-48.
176. See Mahmoud A. EI-Gamal, "Interest" and the Paradox of Contemporary
Islamic Law and Finance, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 108, 108-11 (2003) (describing
the dichotomy between those scholars who view interest as unlawful under Islamic
law and those who have more relaxed views on Islamic banking and finance).
177. EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 51-52.
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be equivalent to interest exclude the mark-up credit sales from the
prohibition. In other words:
The concept of Riba is not confined to money lending only, but extends to
exchange of goods as well. Shariah recognizes two forms of Riba-Riba
al-Nasiah and Riba al-Fadl.
Riba al-Nasiah: Riba al-Nasiah deals with Riba in money-to-money
exchange, provided the exchange is delayed or deferred and additional
charge is associated with such deferment. The term Nasi'ah ... means to
postpone, defer, or wait, and refers to the time that is allowed to the
borrower to repay the loan in return for the "addition" or the "premium."
This kind of Riba is the basis of the prohibition of interest as practiced in
today's financial transactions. The prohibition of Riba al-Nasi'ah
essentially implies that the fixing in advance of a positive return on a loan
as a reward for waiting is not permitted by the Shariah. It makes no
difference whether the return is a fixed or variable percentage of the
principal, or an absolute amount to be paid in advance or on maturity, or a
gift or service to be received as a condition for the loan.
Riba al-Fadl: Riba al-Fadl is more subtle and deals with hand-to-hand or
barter exchange. Such prohibition is derived from the sayings of the
Prophet (pbuh) who required that commodities are exchanged for cash
instead of barter since there may be differences in the quality to ensure
that no exploitation takes place due to any mismatch in the quantity and
the quality of the exchanges. Otherwise, it may give rise to an unjust
increase, i.e., Riba. The concept of Riba al-Fadl is remarkably similar to
the prohibition of increase in lending victuals in the Old Testament
(Leviticus 25:37). Whereas the Old Testament prohibits quantitative
increases, Riba aI-Fadl prohibits qualitative increases as well.
Considering that in today's markets, exchange takes place through the
medium of money, the relevance of Riba al-Fadl has diminished, but the
essence of the concept remains applicable to similar situations.
17 8
Riba was gradually prohibited, although only initially
discouraged. 79 Charging compound interest was prevalent in pre-
178. ZAMIR IQBAL & ABBAS MIRAKHOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC
FINANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 55-56 (2007).
179. QUR'AN, supra note 54, at 30:39 ("That which you give in usury For
increase through the property Of (other) people, will have No increase with Allah:
But that which you give For charity, seeking The Countenance of Allah, (Will
increase): it is These who will get A recompense multiplied.").
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Islamic Arabia and was the first to be forbidden. 18 It was common
practice to charge interest at a certain maturity date and then
compound, or double and multiply, that interest at future maturity
dates. 's The final prohibition was more clear and categorical,8 2
which came through one of the last verses of the Quran and
prohibited, in the view of some scholars, compound interest.8 3 It is
important to note that the Quran does not define the term riba.
However, we may understand the basic concept of riba from the
Prophetic traditions, as discussed below. Due to the lack of certainty
regarding the definition of riba, the Supreme Court of Pakistan
remanded a decision of the Shariat Appellate Bench declaring
interest in all forms unconstitutional on account of being un-Islamic
in order for the Federal Shariat Court to conduct "thorough and
elaborate research ... of financial systems ... prevalent in the
contemporary Muslim countries."'8 4
180. Id. at 3:130 ("0 ye who believe! Devour not Usury, Doubled and
multiplied; But fear Allah; that Ye may (really) prosper.").
181. EL-GAMAL,supra note 19, at50.
182. QUR'AN, supra note 54, at 2:275-79.
Those who devour usury Will not stand except As stands one whom The
Satan by his touch Hath driven to madness. That is because they say: "Trade
is like usury," But Allah hath permitted trade And forbidden usury. Those
who after receiving Admonition from their Lord, Desist, shall be pardoned
For the past; their case Is for Allah (to judge); But those who repeat (The
offence) are Companions Of the Fire: they will Abide therein (for ever).
Allah will deprive Usury of all blessing, But will give increase For deeds of
charity: For He loveth not Any ungrateful Sinner.
Those who believe, And do deeds of righteousness, And establish regular
prayers And give [charity], Will have their reward With their Lord: On them
shall be no fear, Nor shall they grieve.
O ye who believe! Fear Allah, and give up What remains of your demand For
usury, if ye are Indeed believers.
If ye do it not, Take notice of war From Allah and His Messenger: But if ye
repent, Ye shall have Your capital sums: Deal not unjustly, And ye shall not
Be dealt with unjustly.
Id.
183. EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 50.
184. United Bank Ltd. v. MIS Farooq Bros., P.L.D. 2002 S.C. 800 (Pak.), 18,
June 24, 2002, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk//sublinks
/judgements/JUDGMENT%201N%20RIBA%20CASE.zip.
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According to the Prophetic traditions, riba is generally categorized
in two forms: (i) "riba of deferment," accruing over time through
deferment of payments (in its worst form it takes the form of
compound interest as practiced in the pre-Islamic Arabia); and
(ii) "riba of increase," occurring in the form of an increase in
exchange of different quantities of good and commodities of same
genus or kind.'85 Both forms are discussed in the Prophetic traditions.
Riba of deferment refers to an increase that generally arises out of
the money loans. One authentic Prophetic tradition prohibited riba of
increase and outlined the general standard: "Gold for gold, silver for
silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, and salt for
salt, like for like, hand to hand, and any increase is riba."'186 To
illustrate further:
Indeed, as some Hanafi jurists have noted, the six-commodities Prophetic
tradition... stipulated two conditions: "hand to hand" and "in equal
amounts." Thus, if one traded an ounce of gold today for a deferred price
of one ounce of gold next year, the transaction would still be deemed
riba, despite the zero interest rate, because of violation of the "hand-to-
hand" restriction. Those Hanafi jurists reasoned as follows: An ounce of
gold today is clearly worth more than an ounce of gold in one year
(recognizing the time value of money). Thus, one would never trade an
ounce of gold today for an ounce of gold next year, unless one is getting
something else in return (which is not disclosed in the sales contract).
Whatever that extra benefit may be, they argued, it constitutes riba.1
87
The above Hanafi view is further explained by a Maliki jurist:
It is thus apparent from the law that what is targeted by the prohibition of
riba is the excessive inequity it entails. In this regard, equity in certain
transactions is achieved through equality. Since the attainment of equality
in exchange of items of different kinds is difficult, we use their values in
monetary terms. Thus, equity may be ensured through proportionality of
value for goods that are not measured by weight and volume. Thus, the
ratio of exchanged quantities will be determined by the ratio of the values
of the different types of goods traded. For example, if a person sells a
185. EL-GAMAL, Supra note 19, at49-51.
186. Id. at 50-51 (explaining that "Hanafi jurists extended the prohibition to all
fungible goods measured by weight or volume, whereas Shafi'i and Maliki jurists
restricted it to monetary commodities (gold and silver) and storable foodstuffs").
187. Id. at 52.
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horse in exchange for clothes ... if the value of the horse is fifty, the
value of the clothes should be fifty. [If the value of each piece of clothing
is five], then the horse should be exchanged for [ten] pieces of clothing.
As for [fungible] goods measured by volume or weight, equity requires
equality, since they are relatively homogenous, and thus have similar
benefits. Since it is not necessary for a person owning one of those goods
to exchange it for goods of the same type, justice in this case is achieved
by equating volume or weight, since the benefits are very similar.
188
The concept of equity of and efficiency in exchange is supported
by various Prophetic traditions, such as when a man brought some
high quality dates for the Prophet from another city. The Prophet
inquired if all the dates from that city were the same. The man
replied that he exchange two or three volumes of inferior quality
dates for ones of higher quality. Disapproving the practice, the
Prophet told him not to do that again, and advised him to sell the
lower quality dates and buy higher quality dates with the proceeds.
Selling the lower quality dates at the best market price and buying
the higher quality ones at the most competitive price, ensures overall
market and exchange efficiency by pre-committing those who
observe riba of increase to acquire market information and avoid any
disadvantage. 8 9
As for time value of money, some recent scholars have the
following observation:
It is a common misunderstanding and a myth that by prohibiting interest
on loans, Islam denies the concept of the time value of money. Islamic
scholars have always recognized the time value of money, but maintain
that the compensation for such value has its limitations. Recognition of an
indirect economic value of time does not necessarily mean acknowledging
any right of equivalent material compensation for this value in all cases.
188. Id. at 52-53 (footnote omitted).
Of course, lacking the tools of calculus, which were only developed six
centuries later, he could not speak of marginal utilities and hence spoke only
of 'benefits.' However, the economic idea is still the same: Equity dictates
equality of amount when trading fungibles of the same genus, and equality of
value when trading nonfungibles or goods of different genera.
Id. at 53 n. 17.
189. Id. at 53.
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According to the Shariah, compensation for the value of time in sales
contracts is acknowledged, but in the case of lending, increase (interest) is
prohibited as a means of material compensation for time.
The Islamic notion of opportunity cost of capital and time value of money
can be clearly understood by reviewing the distinction between
investment and lending. Time by itself does not give a yield, but can only
contribute to the creation of value when an economic activity is
undertaken. Given a sum of money, it can be invested in a business
venture or it can be lent for a given period of time. In case of investment,
the investor will be compensated for any profit and loss earned during that
time and Islam fully recognizes this return on the investment as a result of
an economic activity. On the other hand, if money is in the form of a loan,
it is an act of charity where surplus funds, are effectively being utilized to
promote economic development and social well-being.
In response to the contemporary understanding that interest on a loan is a
reward for the opportunity cost of the lender, Islamic scholars maintain
that interest fixed ex ante is certain, while profits or losses are not and to
take a certain as a compensation for the uncertain amounts to indulging in
Riba and is therefore unlawful. The element of uncertainty diminishes
with time and the resultant return on investment is realized, rather than
the accruing of return due to passage of time. In short, Islam's stand on
the time value of money is simple and clear. Money is a medium of
exchange; time facilitates completion of economic activity, and the owner
of capital is to be compensated for any return resulting from economic
activity. Lending should be a charitable act without any expectation of
monetary benefit.1
90
190. IQBAL & MIRAKHOR, supra note 178, at 61-62 (emphasis in original).
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2. Riba Today
Modem scholars have attempted to define riba:
Focusing on Riba in financial transaction, now we can construct a more
formal definition of the term. According to the Shariah, Riba technically
refers to the "premium" that must be paid by the borrower to the lender
along with the principal amount as a condition for the loan or for an
extension in the duration of loan. At least four characteristics define the
prohibited interest rate: (1) it is positive and fixed ex-ante; (2) it is tied to
the time period and the amount of the loan; (3) its payment is guaranteed
regardless of the outcome or the purposes for which the principal was
borrowed; and (4) the state apparatus sanctions and enforces its collection.
This definition of the term "Riba" is generally accepted by all and is clear,
straight-forward, and unambiguous. One would not find any dispute in the
literal or the obvious meaning of the term Riba, but it is the interpretation
and scope of the prohibition and its applicability to practical life which
raise several questions for Shariah scholars who have dealt with them
over a period of time and each time a new situation arises.191
Introducing a "benefit analysis" for examining the classical
jurisprudential texts, Professor Mahmoud El-Gamal argues that
"balancing economic freedom... with risk of abuse" always
remained the guiding principle during the classical age of Islamic
law. 192 While balancing these matters, the classical jurists would
overrule the risk of usury and excessive uncertainty in favor of
benefit consideration. For instance, El-Gamal expands his argument
that prepaid forward sales were permissible because of the overriding
benefit to agriculture and other industries, despite excessive
uncertainty for the subject matter.1 93 Buy-back or same-item sale-
repurchase was also allowed because the benefits were greater than
191. Id. at 56 (observing also that the "Four most commonly asked questions are
whether the prohibition is limited to consumer loans only, whether only excessive
interest or compounding of interest is prohibited, whether adjustment for inflation
or any indexation . . . falls within the definition of Riba, and finally whether
prohibition of interest denies time value of money").
192. EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 48.
193. Id.
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the risk that such transactions might serve as a vehicle to charge
interest. 194
Scholars have noted that understanding riba today is more
difficult, particularly if relying on the help of financial economics.
Despite the works of classical jurists being relatively inconclusive
vis-A-vis the complexity of today's financial markets, such works are
still helpful in understanding various aspects of riba. The scholars
went on to observe that "understanding riba as prohibiting interest is
only partly true, since in the context of credit sales the rules tolerate
recognition of the [time value or] opportunity costs of money. 1 95
In deducing rules on riba, the classical jurists derived five
rationales as the underlying causes to understand the principles
governing riba. Collectively, such causes represent "[m]athematical
equivalency; [a]voiding commercial exploitation; [m]inimizing
commerce in currency and foodstuffs; [1linking lawfulness of gain to
risk-taking; [and] [u]sing money and markets to allocate and
moderate risks."' 96 Another view about the prohibition of riba relates
to distributive justice: money should keep circuiting within society
and not remain limited to a few hands. 197 A more recent view is that
the religious prohibition saves individuals from abusing the
availability of potentially self-detrimental credit, helps avoid
excessive indebtedness on account of individual's irrational
behavior, and protects against "paying or receiving unfair
compensation for receipt or extension of credit."1 98 The more popular
view, however, is that interest is exploitative, and therefore
prohibited. 199
194. See id. (noting also that if the second sale is stipulated in the first
agreement it would be clearly prohibited).
195. FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES, III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE:
RELIGION, RISK AND RETURN 86 (1998).
196. Id. at 78.
197. IMRAN AHSAN KHAN NYAZEE, THE RULES AND DEFINITION OF RIBA 7
(2000), available at http://www.islamic-finance.net.
198. EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 54-55 (arguing from the modem
psychological and behavioral economic research "that humans exhibit fundamental
forms of irrationality in time preference, against which precommitment
mechanisms (including those based on religion) can protect them").
199. Iqbal & Khan, supra note 165, at 4.
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Unfair compensation could be eliminated by pegging the interest
rate to the market, and contemporary Islamic finance owes its market
interest rate determination (for any particular individual or entity) to
conventional finance and its regulatory mechanism. In this regard,
benchmarking Islamic finance credit sales interest rates to
conventional interest rates has been regarded to be appropriate. 00
Since the objectives of commercial lending could be achieved by
way of commutative contracts, Islamic law excludes lending from
mainstream financial transactions.20 ' Lending is generally considered
a charitable act in Islamic law.202 By not claiming repayment as
compensation, the lender seeks to give time value of his or her
money in charity."0 3
As noted, Islamic law aims to eliminate both the exploitation that
is inherent in loan interest and other dishonest and unjust gains in all
exchange transactions. To summarize the classical definition of riba,
when the amount has been determined, no increase can be demanded
if the payment is not made on time.20 4 In this way, the definition of
riba extends beyond compensation for the money lent. Therefore, the
need for understanding riba in sales is equally important.0 5
B. EXCESSIVE UNCERTAINTY OR AMBIGUITY (GHARAR)
Excessive uncertainty or ambiguity ("uncertainty") generally
includes lack of complete information, deceit, risk, and inherent
uncertainty as to the subject matter of the contract. Uncertainty about
future events and quality of goods may also be included, whether any
particular incompleteness is unilateral, bilateral, multilateral,
intentional, or otherwise. It is impossible to ensure absolute certainty
in any given transaction. It is because of the recognition of this
intrinsic limitation that Islamic law tolerates minor uncertainty, but
invalidates contracts containing excessive uncertainty.2 6 Like riba,
200. EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 53-54.
201. ld. at 57.
202. Id.
203. Id. (extending also the same principle to lending of usufruct of property).
204. Iqbal & Khan, supra note 165, at 5.
205. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 195, at 74.
206. EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 58-59 (relating four conditions that invalidate
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scholars have argued that the prohibition of uncertainty protects
investors from excessive financial exposure "or payment of
mispriced premia to eliminate existing risks. 20 7
Examining conventional insurance and derivatives on the basis of
uncertainty, the contemporary jurists prohibited such transactions
including naked options. The jurists do not consider security,
insurance, and the option to exercise a right to be valid objects of
sale; the premia of insurance and the price of options are certain, but
the benefit to be derived from them are not, and thus the transaction
comprises uncertainty. Analyzing the prohibition, it has been noted
that jurists have prohibited only the unbundled sale of a contingency
a contract first listed by Professor Al-Darir).
First, [uncertainty] must be excessive to invalidate a contract. Thus, minor
uncertainty about an object of sale (e.g., if its weight is known only up to the
nearest ounce) does not affect the contract. Second, the potentially affected
contract must be a commutative financial contract (e.g., sales). Thus, giving a
gift that is randomly determined (e.g., the catch of a diver) is valid, whereas
selling the same item would be deemed invalid based on [uncertainty].
Third, for [uncertainty] to invalidate a contract, it must affect the principal
components thereof (e.g., the price or object of sale). Thus, the sale of a
pregnant cow was deemed valid, even though the status of the calf may not be
known. Indeed, the price of a pregnant cow would be higher than the price of
the same cow if it were not pregnant. However, the sale of its unborn calf by
itself is not valid based on [uncertainty]. In the first case, the primary object
of sale is the cow itself, whereas in the latter case the object of sale is the
unborn calf, which may be still-born. Finally, if the commutative contract
containing excessive [uncertainty] meets a need that cannot be met otherwise,
the contract would not be deemed invalid based on that [uncertainty]. A
canonical example is .. .[prepaid forward sale], wherein the object of sale
does not exist at contract inception, giving rise to excessive [uncertainty].
However, since that contract allows financing of agricultural and industrial
activities that cannot be financed otherwise, it is allowed despite that
[uncertainty]. Similarly, while contemporary jurists forbade commercial
insurance based on excessive [uncertainty] and availability of
noncommutative [Islamic insurance] alternatives, they currently allow
[Islamic insurance] companies to deal with conventional reinsurance
companies, since [Islamic reinsurance] alternatives are not yet available.
Id.
207. Id. at 60-61 (noting empirical findings of contemporary behavioral finance
literature to emphasize that "human idiosyncrasies" such as people's preference of
risk-loving behavior over risk-and-loss averse behavior depend on how a
"reference point" is presented to them, and also noting that a religious
precommitment helps individuals to avoid financial detriments).
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or legal right-which is termed to be essentially trading in unbundled
credit and unbundled risk-and not the bundled sale of insurance,
credit, and options.20 s
V. FINANCIAL ENGINEERING IN
CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC FINANCE
Forces such as changes in supply and demand or regulatory
structure drive financial innovation and financial engineering so that
financial institutions can remain profitable.2 °9 Summarizing the
Islamic finance contract conditions, scholars have outlined a list of
five a priori stipulations: (1) compliance with Islamic law in general,
(2) conscious and willing agreement of the contract conditions,
(3) clarity and awareness that eliminates uncertainties, (4) capability
to fulfill all contract conditions at the time of its execution including
possession or ownership of the goods or services sought to be
transferred, and (5) commitment of the parties not to subterfuge the
spirit of Islamic law by applying any legal trick.10
The scholars have provided some general guidelines for financial
engineering in the today's IFS industry. The guidelines include
observing the principles of Islamic law that pertain to applying
Juristic Reasoning, and other lawmaking considerations such as
taking a lenient view, safeguarding public interest, eliminating
hardship, and granting concessions in case of necessity.2 '
208. Id. at 62.
209. Iqbal & Khan, supra note 165, at 2.
210. Id. at 10-11 (characterizing this summarization as the five C's of Islamic
finance).
211. Jd.at1l-12.
All these principles emphasize that the guiding principle for ijtihad [Juristic
Reasoning] is to ensure preservation of the basic objectives of Shariah
[Islamic Law] .... Within those overall objectives, these principles provide
guidelines for dealing with issues arising from the unfolding complexities of
applying the rules of [Islamic law] to new situations. [Taking a lenient view]
[i]stihsan refers to departure from a ruling in a particular situation in favour
of another ruling which brings about ease. This is done by taking a lenient
view of an act which would be considered a "violation" on a stricter
interpretation of the action based on earlier qiyas [analogical reasoning].
Masalih mursalah [Safeguarding public interest] similarly refers to making an
exception to the application of a general provision of law for safeguarding
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A. ISLAMIC BANKING
As of 2002, ninety-seven Islamic banks were operating throughout
the world.212 Approximately fifty-eight percent of them are in the
Arab world.2 3 Eighty-three percent of the total assets of the Islamic
banks are concentrated in the Arab world.21 4
Early development of Islamic banking was also facilitated by the
governments of Muslim countries and the OIC. Unlike their
conventional counterparts, Islamic banks have distinguishing
features which include the following: offering risk-sharing credit
services, putting more emphasis on productivity, comparing
conventional emphasis on creditworthiness, offering a wider range of
products primarily by adding risk-sharing in portfolios, and showing
stable monetary returns. These stable monetary returns are "not
possible without the backing of goods and services" that reduce the
public interest. Raf al-haraj [elimination of hardship] is another basic
principle of Islam which refers to removing difficulties faced by people in
general due to change in circumstances. This rule is derived from the
Qur'anic verse which translates as "God intends for you ease, and He does
not want to make things difficult for you" (2:185).
The doctrine of necessity darurah allows temporary suspension of normal law
in case of dire need. Since this doctrine can often be misused, a word of
caution is in order. The doctrine of necessity is meant to be used very
sparingly. It is a rule to handle emergencies. Even in emergencies, it does not
provide an automatic and unrestricted suspension of the law. First of all, it has
to be determined that a situation has arisen where the doctrine can be invoked.
While in individual cases it is the individual conscience which will determine
this, in the case of public application a ruling must be given by [Islamic Law]
scholars, in consultation with the experts in the relevant field. Second, the
suspension of the normal law is not absolute. There are limits and conditions
to be observed. The Qur'anic text (2:173) providing the basis for this doctrine
itself lays down two basic conditions: the user must accept the sanctity of the
original law (implying a return to it as soon as possible) and, in the
meanwhile, use the exception to the minimum possible extent.
Id.
212. MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at 153 tbl.6.1.
213. See id. (indicating that the remainder of the Islamic banks are distributed as
follows: 18.56% in South and South East Asia, 9.28% in Africa, and 14.43% in the
rest of the world).
214. See id. at 154 tbl.6.2 (illustrating that the remainder of assets are distributed
as follows: 13.05% in South and South East Asia and 3.63% in the rest of the
world).
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"room for a sudden and mass movement of such funds,"-a
phenomenon that results from "interest-based short-term funds" and
is generally responsible, destabilizing speculation.2 5
B. INTERNATIONAL BANKING OPERATIONS
While proposing macro-level reforms for Islamic economy,
Islamic economists have proposed guidelines for international
banking operations. Such scholars have suggested that, in general,
taking forward positions in foreign exchange would be permissible.
As for international documentary credits, the scholars recommended
establishing an international fund, financed by Islamic banks through
monthly contributions, and using that fund for the settlements. 6
C. ISLAMIC INVESTMENT FUNDS AND ISLAMIC INVESTMENT
BANKING
The operational rules for domestic and international operations of
Islamic banks are different from their conventional counterparts. For
instance, the business of Islamic investment funds or banks works
within a different structure. These funds are generally either "income
funds" or "growth funds," and are further classified as industry
specific lease funds, commodities funds, equity funds, and petroleum
funds.217
Consistent with Molyneux and Iqbal's explanation, the pool of
funds is managed by a fund promoter who is recognized as an agent
in terms of Islamic agency law and is authorized to take all necessary
actions for the purposes of agency.2 8 The agent or the fund promoter
is entitled to a fixed-fee compensation for services. The fund
promoter then appoints a fund manager who is compensated on a
215. Id. at 153.
216. BLUEPRINT, supra note 21, at 108; see MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9,
at 166 (arguing that the establishment of a coordinating body called the Islamic
Financial Services Board will produce and enforce regulatory standards tailored to
meet the unique needs of the Islamic banking sector).
217. MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at 158.
218. See id. at 157, 173 (identifying a wak lah, or agentship, as one of the main
types of contract in Islamic banking and finance, and stating that wak lah satisfies
the fundamental principles of the Islamic theory of contracts).
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fixed-fee basis or via profit-sharing. Here, Islamic banks and Islamic
investment funds have a slightly different structure. Islamic banks
participate directly in the profit-risk-sharing arrangement (also
known as working-partner or mudarib-under a classical contract
form known as mudarabah, which is discussed below) with the
deposit holder, whereas the fundholders themselves bear all the risk
of investment. 1 9 The profits may be shared, if mutually agreed by
the fund promoter and the fund manager. Furthermore, since the fund
promoter works strictly in accordance with the terms of the agency
granted by the fundholders, the agency agreement must specify the
level of Islamic law compliance and the modes necessary to ensure
such compliance.2 0 Additionally, the fund manager should consult
Islamic law opinions or seek guidance from the Islamic law board of
the fund.221
As for equity funds, which buy and sell shares of various
companies, investment in them is generally considered consistent
with the spirit of Islamic law because investment in a company is not
per se an investment in debt.222 Scholars have, however, prescribed
certain conditions for such investment to be permissible using
various tests. First, using the line of business test, the fund must not
deal with shares of a company whose primary business is illegitimate
according to Islamic law. 223 Second, using the main-business test,
any interest earned by the fund must be "negligible and separable"
from the fund's total income.224 Also, since the sale of debt is only
permissible at face value, the receivable debt in the company's
portfolio must not exceed the "acceptable" proportion. Any interest-
based income in excess of ten-percent has been considered
219. See id. at 157 (explaining that fund promoters have no share in profits
because all of the risk is borne by the fundholders).
220. Id. at 157-58.
221. Id. at 159.
222. See id. at 158 (indicating that equity funds are acceptable under Islamic law
because the shareholders, as the owners of the company, are responsible for the
company's deeds).
223. See id. (identifying conventional banks, alcohol-based beverages industries,
casinos, and pork-based food industry as examples of unlawful businesses
according to Islamic Law).
224. Id.
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unacceptable. 25 Third, using the debt-equity ratio test, the debt-
equity ratio of a company should not exceed one-third debt and two-
thirds equity.226 These debt-equity ratio criteria are constantly
changing.
This and other screening methodologies have been criticized for
being inadequate to ensure compliance with Islamic law.227 As for
the sale-of-debt prohibition in Islamic law and the shares of the
companies that have accounts receivable in their portfolio, scholars
favor permissibility if, after applying the dominant component test,
the ratio of debt receivable is less than fifty percent. 28 Al-Baraka
Investment and Development Company 229 initially developed these
standards and screening rules which were later "copied and
popularized by Dow Jones Islamic Indexes (DJII) and Financial
Times' FTSE Islamic Indexes. 23 °
At the early stages of Islamic mutual funds, various screening
rules were developed. The most controversial of them were the debt
ratios discussed above. During the 1990s, the standardization process
was hastened "especially after DJII changed its cutoff debt ratio from
thirty-three percent of assets to the thirty-three percent market
capitalization."23 ' Soon thereafter, this screening method was no
longer practical. One of the main reasons was that managers would
sell the stock immediately after the ratios changed and crossed the
tolerance threshold-giving rise to "buy high, sell low" cycles. 232
This was followed by a race to develop Islamic hedge funds. 233 The
225. Id. at 159.
226. Id. But see EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 126-27 (explaining that early
views regarding inclusion of companies with interest income in investment
portfolios were strict, but have since become more relaxed, with modem jurists
allowing investment in companies whose accounts receivable debt-equity ratio is
forty-five percent or more of the total assets).
227. See EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 125 (criticizipg these screens for only
incorporating what is impermissible under Islamic law and not including positive
injunctions such as, for instance, "helping the poor").
228. MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at 159.
229. The word Al-Baraka literally means religious and divine blessings.
230. EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 12.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 12-13.
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debt-ratio criterion appears to be less strict in Islamic hedge funds.
For instance, the Meyer's Shari 'a Fund, a pioneer Islamic hedge
fund, has developed a new screen that takes into consideration the
actual interest income and expense, rather than debt-ratios. 234
D. HEDGING AND DERIVATIVES
Recently, clarifying the saying "Sell not what is not with you,"
Professor Hashim Kamali has opined that future contracts in
fungibles do not fall within the scope of the prohibition and are thus
permissible under Islamic law.235 In an earlier work, Professor
Kamali concluded that a blanket prohibition of futures is not
supported by Islamic law.236  He, however, conditioned the
permissibility of the futures to effective regulatory control that
encourages trading in futures for genuine reasons and restricts
speculative risk-taking.237
Islamic law prohibits interest-bearing debt instruments. However,
some Islamic-law-compliant transactions do involve debt such as
manufacturing, cost-plus financing, and leasing. But, Islamic finance
generally faces a scarcity of financial instruments that are used in
conventional finance to contain the market and credit risks involving
debt, equity, commodity, and currency transactions. However,
certain Islamic finance transactions do resemble transaction
structures that, albeit in a limited manner, contain risk exposure-
"partial proxies" to conventional derivatives securities. 238 As
discussed with other classical contract forms and their modem
adaptations, such "derivative-like" transactions2 39 include profit
sharing partnerships, forward contracts, manufacturing contracts,
234. Id. at 129.
235. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, Fiqhi Issues in Commodity Futures, in
FINANCIAL ENGINEERING AND ISLAMIC CONTRACTS 20, 42 (Munawar lqbal
& Tariqullah Khan eds., 2005).
236. See MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, ISLAMIC COMMERCIAL LAW 206-07
(2003) (categorizing critics' prohibitive judgments on futures and options as
speculative and insufficient to justify a prohibition on trading in futures).
237. Id. at 207.
238. VOGEL& HAYES, supra note 195, at 219.
239. See EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 81-92 (discussing the term "derivative-
like sales" as two permissible types of contracts under Islamic law that allow for
sales of nonexistent objects).
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absolute option contracts, third-party guarantees, and partial advance
payment contracts.
E. REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
After the bursting of the technology stock bubble, Islamic Real
Estate Investment Trusts ("REITs") emerged as an alternative
investment strategy. Equity REITs are permissible according to
Islamic law, and otherwise lucrative because of the fact that REITs in
the United States are required to give most of their net income in
dividends.140 The optimal debt-equity ratio for REITs is considered to
be between forty and sixty percent. Therefore, the DJII has hindered
REITs because, according to the DJII, the permissible debt-equity
ratio should be less than thirty-three percent. However, Islamic
REITs have not disclosed the methodology that allows them to invest
in REITs with higher debt ratios. The methodology might be based
on a necessity argument or that REITs represent "a different set of
asset class, ... merit[ing] a different screening benchmark. 241
F. CLASSICAL CONTRACT FORMS AND MODERN TRANSACTIONS
1. Contract One: Profit-Sharing Dormant Partnership (Mudarabah)
Capital owners and investment managers enter into profit-risk
sharing arrangements.242 Distribution of profit is in accordance with
the pre-agreed proportion, and losses are borne by the capital owner
to the extent of the capital invested. The investment manager loses
the opportunity cost of his labor. Parties understand that the profit is
not guaranteed. Although the investment manager is to follow the
contract terms in how he conducts business, the capital owner cannot
interfere in the day-to-day business. The investment manager is a
fiduciary and expected to conduct the business with utmost honesty.
Administrative expenses and those in the usual course of business are
240. See id. at 129-30 (explaining that REITs are permissible under Islamic law
because they engage in buying, maintaining, and leasing real estate, and derive
most of their income from rent).
241. Id. at 131.
242. See generally MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at 168-69 (describing the
essential elements of the mudarabah).
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charged to the expense account. Profits cannot be distributed before
settling liabilities and restoring equity.
Islamic banks undertake the above classical form from their asset
and liability sides. As for the asset side, Islamic banks become the
capital owner and use their deposit funds as the capital.243 Islamic
banks are generally authorized by the deposit holders to pool their
funds toward capital investment by the Islamic bank. As for the
liability side, Islamic banks become the investment manager, with
depositors serving as capital owners.2" The depositors authorize the
Islamic bank to mix their capital with its own funds-absence of this
authorization will invalidate the pooling of funds. Profits are
distributed according to an agreed proportion, but losses "must be
borne in proportion to the capital provided by each [party]. 245 The
profits are usually benchmarked to the market interest rate. Losses
are rarely reported-or may only be suffered in theory. Many
criticize the practical certainty of profit and equate it with prohibited
interest.246
This contract form is also used as an Islamic hedge fund and could
either be for a specific or general purpose. The interest in the fund
can only be traded if the fund mostly invests in "tangible assets,
not ... financial instruments. 247 Similar to conventional hedge
funds, Islamic fund managers are compensated for administrative
expenses, receive a "carried interest" in the fund profits, and are
protected from liability in case of any capital loss, unless they
personally invested in the pool of funds.248 This structure gives the
fund manager a defacto call option on the profits of the fund.249
243. Id. at 169.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Hegazy, supra note 17, at 148.
247. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 195, at 221.
248. Id. at 221-22.
249. See id. at 231 (discussing how the manager's at-risk reputation creates a
check upon the manager's willingness to engage in risky investment strategies).
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2. Contract Two: Profit-Risk Sharing Partnership (Musharakah)
This contract form resembles Contract One with some differences.
In the present contract, both parties provide capital, manage the
enterprise, share pre-agreed proportional profit, and share the loss
proportionate to their capital investment."' Islamic banks use a
modified version of this contract called a "diminishing
partnership." '' The Islamic bank and its beneficiary enter into a
partnership to own an asset, with a condition that the bank "will
gradually sell [its] share to the beneficiary at an agreed price and in
accordance with an agreed schedule." '252 The Islamic bank provides
the financing for early acquisition of the property. The pre-agreed
payment schedule, through which the Islamic bank sells its share in
the asset to the beneficiary, is benchmarked to the prevalent market
interest rate. Although charging interest directly on asset-financing
would be subject to the riba prohibition, Islamic banks in effect
receive interest for financing asset-purchase by following this
transaction structure.
Another form of a diminishing partnership requires the customer
to initially serve as an investment manager, as in Contract One
above. After the customer starts buying the assets, it becomes a
proportional co-owner and thus partner, and the contract is
transformed into a Profit-Risk Sharing Partnership, of Contract Two
above. 53 Risk in the property shifts to customer with the transfer of
property and, accordingly, the partnership diminishes. 54 After
buying one hundred percent interest in the asset, the customer
becomes the sole proprietor and full owner of the assets.255
3. Contract Three: Cost-Plus Financing (Murabaha)
Islamic law permits payment of a premium over cash price on a
deferred price. For instance, A is selling a product at a cash price of
$100 and B offers to pay $105 but with deferred payment. Islamic
250. MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at 169.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Iqbal & Khan, supra note 165, at 15.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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banks use this transaction model to provide finance to their
customers with a cost-plus marked-up profit.
The customer executes an order to the Islamic bank to buy certain
assets, and provides a description of the seller and the cash price. In
turn, the Islamic bank enters in two transactions: first with the seller
to buy the assets with cash; second, with the customer to sell the
assets to the customer at a deferred price, which is scheduled by way
of installments or a lump-sum payment and has a built-in marked-up
profit component. 6 The customer becomes an agent of the bank: "In
the contract between the Islamic bank and the supplier, the bank
often appoints the person placing the order (the ultimate purchaser)
as agent to receive the goods purchased by the bank." '257 The marked-
up profit is benchmarked to the prevalent market interest rate. Some
Islamic banks do not have the asset transferred in their name-
mainly to avoid transaction costs-and instead transfer the asset
directly to the customer. Often, Islamic banks authorize the customer
to act as the bank's agent and transfer the asset in its own name. It is
worth mentioning that, despite criticism on the extended use of this
transaction, cost-plus financing transactions consist of the bulk of the
Islamic banking business, representing over seventy percent of
Islamic financial transactions. 8
4. Contract Four: Leasing (Ijarah)
Islamic law permits leasing of properties and their use against
payment of rent. IFS institutions deal in two forms of leases:
operational and finance leases. In the case of an operational lease, the
usufruct generated by a leased asset, "such as machinery, airplanes,
ships or trains, is sold" by the lessor for fixed period.2 19 The lessor
retains the risk in property, but the lessee is responsible for usual
maintenance. Being for a short period, the risk of the lessor is high.
In case of a finance lease, the period of lease is spread over a longer
period of time so that the lessor is able "to amortize the cost of the
256. MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at 169-70.
257. Id. at 170.
258. Hegazy, supra note 17, at 148.
259. MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at 170.
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asset with profit" and retain relatively higher financial security.2 60
The lessee may purchase the asset at market value after the lease
period ends. A finance lease is generally not terminable at the option
of the lessee, and requires mutual consent if the lessee would like to
sell it during the lease period. Scholars have considered this aspect of
the finance lease to be financially infeasible because it makes the
lessee worse off than the customers of interest-based financing,
where such a stipulation does not exist.2 61 There are also doubts as to
whether the non-cancelable nature of the lease is permissible under
Islamic law. 62 As in Contract Three above, both of the leasing
contracts are initiated at the request of the customer or the future
lessee. At the conclusion of the contract, the asset is transferred to
the lessee at a nominal price, or by way of a gift. Jurists have ruled
that such transfer can only be made with a separate contract after
termination of the original contract, and "on the basis of an advance
promise to effect" the transfer.2 63
5. Contract Five: Manufacturing Contract (Istisna)
Parties enter into a manufacturing contract of a specified product.
The parties also agree on specifications, description, delivery date,
pricing, and its modes. It is also permissible to defer the payment of
price in such contracts.216 IFS institutions use this contract form for
financing a manufacturing contract and enter into two manufacturing
contracts. The first contract is between the party initiating a
manufacturing request and the bank. This contract includes the price
the customer will pay, usually in installments, and the date on which
the bank agrees to deliver the product.2 65 The second contract is in
the form of a subcontract between the bank and a manufacturing
contractor to manufacture and deliver the product as requested.2 66
The contractor usually receives advance payment or staggered
payments during the contract time. Usually the delivery dates are the
260. Id.
261. Id. at 170-71.
262. Id. at 171.
263. Id. at 172.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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same in both the contracts, and the original purchaser is authorized to
take delivery directly from the contractor. 267 The repayment schedule
of the manufacturing contract is usually benchmarked at the
prevalent market interest rate.
The buyer locks in the price of customized commodities or
products and any upward price movement-whether demand-driven
or otherwise-of such commodities or products is not likely to have
an adverse impact on the buyer. However, the manufacturer cannot
sell the commodities/products to anyone else at higher price.268
6. Contract Six: Absolute Option (Khiyar Al-Shart)
One party may confirm or cancel a contract in light of an absolute
option contained therein. For instance, in the manufacturing contract
(Contract Five above), the parties may agree for an absolute option to
be exercised by the manufacturer in case all of the buyer's similar
manufacturing orders are sourced to the manufacturer.269
7. Contract Seven: Forward Sale (Salam)
Parties agree for future delivery for the price paid in advance.
Forward sale is not available in every commodity; it is usually
restricted to fungibles.270 IFS institutions undertake the forward sale
in two ways. First, the IFS institution enters into a forward sale
contract, similar to Contract Five above, where the supplier requests
future delivery and payment schedule. 71 Second, the IFS institution
buys a commodity by paying in advance and, in an independent
267. Id.
268. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 195, at 225.
269. Id. at 221.
[P]arties may protect themselves against not only movements in the
underlying asset price but also events which may be completely unrelated to
the underlying asset. As a (possibly valid) example, an airline company may
purchase by ... [forward contract] one hundred planes for $5 million each on
a date five years in the future, giving the manufacturer an option, which it
agrees to exercise only if the airline does not source all of its intervening
plane requirements from that manufacturer.
Id.
270. MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at 172-73.
271. Id.
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contract, sells the commodity to its customer on installments. 272 The
forward sale contract installments have a built-in profit that is usually
benchmarked at the prevalent market interest rate.
By entering into a forward contract and having been paid in full,
the forward seller may either already have the commodity or may
produce (or grow) it for future delivery.273 In the event that the seller
has proprietary information for price volatility in future, the seller
can hedge itself by securing a higher price against future delivery,
when it expects adverse price movements in the future.274
8. Contract Eight: Islamic Insurance (Takaful)
Risk-taking is part and parcel to the entrepreneurial spirit, and
Islamic law recognizes the need for a protection.275 Islamic law also
accepts seeking protection against loss from natural calamities.
Covering risks that are game-oriented is not permissible within the
valid Islamic insurance business.276 Islamic law provides a different
structure for protection from entrepreneurial risk and loss from
natural disasters. The development of the Islamic insurance industry
has followed a non-conventional structure wherein the insurance
272. Id.
273. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 195, at 223-24 (comparing the forward
sale contract to the manufacturing contract and noting that one primary difference
is that, in the forward sale contract, the seller can use the forward payment for any
purpose, while in the manufacturing contract, the seller is required to use the
progressive payments solely for the production of the goods).
274. See id. at 222-24 (explaining that the seller can consider two factors when
determining the sale price-the predicted volatility of the good's price and the
expected change of the good's price-and will enter into the contract when the
price is expected to decrease or become volatile because this guarantees a floor
sale price and averts risk).
275. See MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at 160 (listing three forms of risk:
first, the "entrepreneurial risk" that arises in the normal course of business; second,
the risk of natural disasters; and third, the unnecessary, self-created risk that arises
when people play "games"). The authors suggest that the first two types of risk are
inherent in daily life and must be addressed. Id.
276. See id. (clarifying that "games," which create risks not part of daily life, are
unnecessary for the individual because the individual could avoid them by
choosing not to play them and are unnecessary for society because they do not
contribute to societal wealth). These "games" are equitable to gambling, which
Islam prohibits. Id.
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company participates on a profit-loss sharing basis with a pool of
participants (or policy holders) that mutually agree to cover each
other in case of loss. 277 In this structure the Islamic insurance
company does not provide assurance/insurance to the policy holder,
but acts on behalf of the policy holders to manage the business. The
contributions or premiums are pooled into a fund and invested into
Islamic-law compliant investment opportunities. Profits are
calculated after paying any claims, and surplus is shared between the
company and the policy holders at a predetermined proportion.278 In
this regard, the relationship of the company vis-A-vis the policy
holders is in the form of Contract One above. It is worth mentioning
that no reinsurance, Islamic-law-compliant alternatives are currently
available. Therefore, contemporary jurists have allowed Islamic
insurance companies to deal with conventional reinsurance
companies.279
9. Contract Nine: Agency Contract (Wakalah)
This contract entitles the person appointed as an agent to receive a
predetermined fee for performing a specified job or task, irrespective
of whether the assigned job or task was successfully accomplished.
Penalties for breach of trust follow in case of dishonesty or violation
of the terms of the contract.28° Islamic banks use this contract form
for rendering fund management or investment management services
to their customers. The contract is priced with a fixed amount for
providing managerial services. After deduction. of the managerial fee,
the "entire profit or loss is passed back to the fund providers. 2 8 '
277. See id. at 161 (explaining that it is acceptable to protect oneself against
suffering, but it is improper to profit from that suffering and, as such, the Islamic
insurance industry was developed around the idea of taking care of one another).
278. Id.
279. EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 59. This appears to be a recurrence of the
necessity argument that earlier allowed Islamic banks to deal with interest in their
effort to compete with the conventional banks. Some scholars have cautioned that
a persistent exercise of the doctrine of necessity "may not only contaminate the
essence of the system, it may also raise suspicions in the minds of those who have
put their trust in the system." IQBAL & MIRAKHOR, supra note 177, at 225.
280. MOLYNEUX & IQBAL, supra note 9, at 173.
281. Id.
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10. Contract Ten: Third-Party Guarantee (Damanah)
Islamic law allows a third party to serve as guarantor to the
contracting parties. The guarantor, however, can only charge for its
administrative expenses, and not the cost of capital.2"' Owing to
compensation restrictions, guarantors in contemporary Islamic
finance only sponsor entities such as the government or holding
companies. The guarantor also holds a lien on the contract assets."8 3
Some scholars contend that third-party guarantee models could serve
as a put option in view of the fact that various Islamic banks provide
third-party guarantees to cost-plus financing (Contract Three above).
That is to say, in the event that the purchaser concludes that the cost-
plus financing is not as valuable as once thought, it may
(theoretically) stop paying and allow the bank to take possession.
This may be "a put option with a strike price equal to the value of the
remaining installment payments." '284
11. Contract Eleven: Partial Advance Payment (Urbun)
The parties agree to a future performance subject to one party
furnishing partial advance payment. In the future, the party that has
tendered the partial payment may choose to disregard the contract
and, in such case, forfeit the money advanced to the other party.
Although it cannot be priced on the conventional options pricing
model, the partial advance payment contract may offer a close
substitute for conventional financial options. For instance, an airline
company intends to buy a fleet of aircrafts at a certain price, which
may move upwards in the future, beyond the company's ability to
pay. The company would also like to have the option to buy from the
open market if doing so would be economical. The company may
enter into the partial advance payment contract with the
manufacturer, and allow its advance payment to be forfeited if the
price turned out to be lower than the company contracted. 285
282. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 195, at 221.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 229 (noting, however, that the bank may place a condition in the
guarantee agreement "allowing it to recover from the purchaser any loss ...
suffered").
285. Id. at 227-28.
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12. Contract Twelve: Islamic Bonds or Debt Securities (Sukuk)
a. History
Sukuk is a plural form of saak, which means title or investment
certificate. Sukuk, in a contractual form, existed in the seventh
century (during the first century of Islam).286 Soldiers and other
public officials were paid in cash, as well as in kind. 8 "The payment
in kind was in the form of. .. 'commodity coupons' or 'grain
permits' (both sukuk) that were entitled for the promised quantity of
the commodity (usually grains) upon maturity of the coupons or
permits, as the case may be. 88 Some would sell their coupons or
permits for cash, although scholars at that time disputed
permissibility of such sale.289
Fourteen centuries later, the practice of sukuk was revived in 2001
when the Kingdom of Bahrain issued USD $250 million with five
years of maturity.290 Today, sukuk are mushrooming in the
international financial markets and their structures are becoming
increasingly complex, as newer transactional aspects are being
added. Duplication of an existing model becomes more competitive,
which gradually diminishes profit margins.291
286. Mohamed Rafe Md. Haneef, Recent Trends and Innovations in Islamic
Debt Securities: Prospects for Islamic Profit and Loss Sharing Securities, in
ISLAMIC FINANCE: CURRENT LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 29, 30 (S. Nazim
Ali ed., 2005).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 30-32 (noting that the Kingdom of Bahrain's issuance was soon
followed by Malaysia issuing USD $600 million sukuk, USD $700 million by the
State of Qatar, and USD $400 million by the 1DB). To date, the trend continues to
grow, and so do the numbers. For instance, Malaysian companies have issued
Islamic debt of USD $24.97 billion as of 2006. Hasan Jafri & Carolyn Lim,
Malaysia to Sell Islamic Bonds, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2006, at C4.
291. See EL-GAMAL, supra note 19, at 11-13 (discussing the role of financial
providers, jurists, and lawyers in the development of IFS products and explaining
that when a product is first developed, it has a captive market and is very
profitable, but then is easily replicated reducing its profit margin).
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b. The Concept
As a general principle,, direct lending, and charging interest
thereupon, is not permissible under Islamic law. Therefore, Islamic
finance professionals, scholars, and jurists created equity-disguised
debt products, wherein, as discussed below, the bondholder in a
leased-based sukuk structure, for instance, holds a beneficial interest
in an underlying asset and receives rental income as profit-which is
usually benchmarked to the prevalent market interest rate or similar
competitive pricing methodology. To achieve this, the transaction
structure uses classical contract forms such as Mudarabah,
Musharakah, Murabahah, Ijarah, Istisna, and Salam, which are
described above. Sukuk, based on any individual contract form or
combinations thereof, are common. Sukuk based on combinations are
known as hybrid sukuk.
Sukuk structures approximate the conventional bond issue, while
maintaining their compliance with Sharia. Duplication of an existing
sukuk structure becomes more competitive, which gradually
diminishes the profit margins. However, the first entrants with an
innovative structure continue to yield high returns. Sukuk issued in
an international market has usually been in the conventional global
bond format in accordance with U.S. Regulation S and Rule 144A.292
c. The Sukuk Standards
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial
Institutions ("AAOIFI") issued the Standard for Investment Sukuk
("Standards") in 2003.293 The AAOIFI Standards are generally
followed by issuers of sukuk. The AAOIFI Standards do not treat
sukuk to be debts of the issuer, but "fractional or proportional
292. See Haneef, supra note 286, at 31 (noting that IDB's USD $400 million
sukuk in 2003 complied with U.S. Regulation S and Rule 144A as did the State of
Qatar's USD $700 million sukuk in 2003, and the Kingdom of Bahrain's USD
$250 million sukuk in 2004).
293. See Michael J. T. McMillen, Sukuk (Islamic Bonds and Securitization):
Toward a Viable Capital (Including Secondary Market), in INTEGRATING ISLAMIC
FINANCE IN THE MAINSTREAM: REGULATION, STANDARDIZATION AND
TRANSPARENCY 145, 148 n.5 (S. Nazim Ali ed., 2007) [hereinafter McMillen,
Islamic Bonds and Securitization].
2008] 719
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
interests in underlying assets, usufructs, services, projects, or
investment activities. '294 "Sukuk may not be issued on a pool of
receivables. Further, the underlying brisiness or activity, and the
underlying transactional structures (such as the underlying leases),
must be Sharia compliant (for example, the business or activity
cannot engage in prohibited business activities). 295
The AAOIFI's Shariah Board (comprised of twenty renowned
international scholars of Islamic law and finance) has recently passed
a six-point resolution that clarifies and revises various existing
AAOIFI Shariah Standards and market practices concerning
issuance of various types of sukuk.296
d. The Sukuk Transaction
The following describes a more prevalent model of the lease-based
sukuk (sukul al-ijara). The model has been used in a number of
sukuk issues.297 The regular lease-based sukuk is in fact lease-ending-
with-purchase-that is, purchase of the underlying assets-and
resembles the conventional asset securitization. The popular
transaction structure is exemplified below. For ease of reference, a
graphical representation of the transaction below is provided in the
Appendix of this Article.
The actual sukuk issuer sets up a special purpose company ("SPC"),
which is bankruptcy-remote and distances the real issuer from the
subscribers, and SPC acts as the apparent issuer and trustee for the issue;
294. Michael J.T. McMillen, Contractual Enforceability Issues: Sukuk and
Capital Market Development, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 427, 429 (2007) [hereinafter
McMillen, Contractual Enforceability Issues].
295. Id.
296. Before announcing revisions in existing skukuk issuance practices and
Standards, the AAOFI's Shariah Board took into consideration recommendations
of various stakeholders from the Islamic finance industry. The Shariah Board's
recommendations are available at http://www.aaoifi.com/aaoifi sb-sukuk
_Feb2008_Eng.pdf.
297. See Haneef, supra note 286, at 32, 42 (noting that the Kingdom of
Bahrain's USD $250 million sukuk, the Federation of Malaysia's USD $600
million sukuk, the State of Qatar's USD $700 million sukuk, and, with more
modifications, the IDB's USD $400 million sukuk all used the leased-based
structure).
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A seller sells certain assets-for example, real estate, plants and
machinery, or infrastructure project concession-to SPC for $750 million;
SPC leases the assets to a lessee for a five year term. The lessee in most
cases is the seller. The lessee also undertakes to buy the assets after the
lease period, that is, after maturity of the sukuk;
SPC establishes a trust in respect to the assets and issues the lease-based
sukuk to raise $750 million with a maturity of five years. Trading at the
secondary markets, if any, starts taking place after this point until
maturity;
The lessee, as per the term of the lease, starts paying six monthly rentals
during the term of the lease, and SPC distributes the rentals among the
sukuk-holders;
After the five-year lease term, SPC sells the assets to the lessee/original
seller pursuant to its undertaking, as mentioned in (iii) above, for $750
million;
To redeem the sukuk upon maturity after five years, SPC distributes $750
million among the sukuk holders; 298
SPC is dissolved after it has outlived its purpose, that is, after the
expiration of a certain time following the redemption of all the sukuk.299
e. Convertible Sukuk
Convertible sukuk are a recent development. Unlike a latent equity
feature in the regular sukuk, convertible sukuk expressly offer
conversion to equity. Convertible sukuk have two parts: non-equity
and equity. The non-equity part yields a coupon return that is paid
from the underlying business activity, such as rent proceeds from the
leased assets. The coupon return is redeemable at pre-agreed dates at
the face value. The conversion-to-equity feature, on the other hand,
allows sukuk's conversion into a share of the designated entity, at a
specified date and at a pre-agreed conversion formula.
298. See id. at 31-42 (outlining a typical leased-based sukuk structure); EL-
GAMAL, supra note 19, at 107-08.
299. Cf Haneef, supra note 286, at 32 fig. I .A.
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In a recent transaction, a Dubai-based port operator issued the
largest sukuk ever, raising USD $3.5 billion.3 0 Being convertible and
using the sukuk-al-musharaka structure, the sukuk were aligned with
a takeover bid. The structure allowed conversion of sukuk into equity
upon an IPO, resembling a pre-IPO convertible bond. A detailed
transaction structure is available at the transaction lawyers'
website. 3°' There are no standard guidelines available specifically for
convertible sukuk that are generally followed. AAOIFI's standards
guidelines are likely to be available soon to fill this gap.
VI. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The scholarship on Islamic finance continues to be alarmingly
insufficient. Academic critique has not partnered with the growing
need for profound analysis. Although accounting and financial
analyses have been consistent, they have not been able to greatly
assist Islamic finance in innovation and financial engineering. As a
result, a trend toward financial reverse-engineering has been
growing, with lawyers being the main drivers. So far, it appears the
legal practitioners have taken the lead in contributing to the Islamic
finance literature.30 2
300. DENTONWILDESAPTE, BANK NOTES 1 (2006), available at http://www.
dentonwildesapte.com/assets/1/16949 1 .pdf.
301. Id. at 1-2.
302. It is becoming customary for practitioners, mostly lawyers and some
financial experts, to write descriptive overviews of transactions that they have
recently handled. Such works include analysis of regulatory and related challenges
of Islamic finance; the lawyers' works have started to focus more on transactional
structuring and regulatory issues. See, e.g., Ayman H. Abdel-Khaleq
& Christopher F. Richardson, New Horizons for Islamic Securities: Emerging
Trends in Sukuk Offerings, 7 CHI J. INT'L L. 409 (2007) (illustrating the legal
issues associated with sukuk supported by assets located outside the Islamic world
through the example of the recent sukuk offered by the East Cameron Gas
Company, a U.S. oil and gas entity); Kilian Bdilz, Islamic Finance for European
Muslims: The Diversity Management of Shari 'ah-Compliant Transactions, 7 CHI J.
INT'L L. 551 (2007) (focusing on the lack of Islamic retail financial products in
Germany and suggesting regulatory changes that would promote the development
of such products); Joseph W. Beach, The Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A
Practical Study of the Creation of Law in Developing Markets, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L.
307 (2005) (describing the goals and provisions of the newly implemented Saudi
Arabian Capital Market Law, of which the author was a primary drafter); Andreas
Junius, Islamic Finance: Issues Surrounding Islamic Law as a Choice of Law
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There are issues both at macro and micro levels that need to be
immediately addressed: regulatory analysis of Muslim country's
markets; 03  comparative corporate governance and developing
Islamic finance stock exchange;30 4 regulatory and quasi-regulatory
institutions; comparative tax structures; risk analyses including
Sharia compliance risk;0 5 capital flight from Muslim countries; 0 6
Under German Conflict of Laws Principles, 7 CHI J. INT'L L. 537 (2007)
(evaluating the decision not to apply Shariah law in the British case Shamil Bank of
Bahrain EC v. Beximco Pharm. Ltd., and analyzing how German courts would
resolve a similar issue); Michael J. T. McMillen, Islamic Shari'ah-Compliant
Project Finance: Collateral Security and Financing Structure Case Studies, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1184 (2001) (detailing four transactions which the author or
his firm structured, two in Saudi Arabia and two in the United States); Michael J.
T. McMillen, Structuring a Securitized Shari 'ah-Compliant Real Estate
Acquisition Financing: A South Korean Study, in ISLAMIC FINANCE: CURRENT
LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 79, 81-104 (S. Nazim Ali ed., 2005) (using a
transaction in South Korea as a case study to illustrate different financing
structures); McMillen, Islamic Bonds and Securitization, supra note 293, at 145
(discussing the implementation of novel sukuk structures in the Bahrain Financial
Harbour Sukuk, as well as factors that impede growth in Islamic capital markets);
McMillen, Contractual Enforceability Issues, supra note 294, at 427 (discussing
the sukuk transaction structure and using this structure to demonstrate the potential
benefits of expanding the IFS industry and highlighting the current enforceability
issues that must be addressed); Umar F. Moghul, No Pain, No Gain: The State of
the Industry in Light of an American Islamic Private Equity Transaction, 7 CHI J.
INT'L L. 469 (2007) (demonstrating the usefulness of the sharikah structure
through the example of a partnership agreement, designed by the author, which an
Islamic bank used to purchase a sizeable minority share in a U.S. company).
303. See Ali Adnan Ibrahim, Developing Capital Markets in Muslim Countries:
Strategies and Policies for Securities Regulation and Corporate Governance, in
ISLAMIC CAPITAL MARKETS: PRODUCTS, REGULATION AND PRACTICES WITH
RELEVANCE TO ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE (forthcoming 2008) (discussing
the roles of corporate governance, culture, and custom in attracting foreign
investment to developing markets and suggesting, among others, that further
research should be conducted to analyze the role of customary law in shaping
capital market development, in particular corporate governance and securities
regulation).
304. See Ali A. Ibrahim, Convergence of Corporate Governance and Islamic
Financial Services Industry: Toward Islamic Financial Services Securities Market,
in INTEGRATING ISLAMIC FINANCE INTO THE MAINSTREAM: REGULATION,
STANDARDIZATION AND TRANSPARENCY (2007) (addressing the likely convergence
of Islamic financial services industry to the modern corporate governance regimes
and arguing that the industry needs to develop a homogeneous securities market).
305. See generally Shaykh Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo, Shari 'ah Compliance Risk,
7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 397 (2007) (defining Shariah-compliance risk, discussing the role
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Islamic finance consumer advocacy; impact of incentives created by
excess liquidity in Middle East; the role and scope of Islamic law
supervisory boards, and the corporate governance analysis of their
work; the issuance of Islamic legal opinions vis-A-vis the exercise of
juristic reasoning; issues pertaining to harmonizing diversified
opinions in Islamic law; and choice of law issues.
As discussed above, the growing use of U.S. Regulation S and
Rule 144A formats in the debt-based IFS transactions of sukuk
presents a pronounced effort by the IFS industry to comply with
modern corporate governance practices. The industry has done little
to address criticism that Sharia supervisory boards indulge in
conflict-of-interest transactions.3 7
Various authors have noted that IFS' growth toward the equity
market has yet to happen,308 and complete integration of Islamic
finance with the international securities markets seems partially
dependent on development of Islamic equity products. Whether the
equity-based transaction structures invite similar criticism, which its
debt-based counterpart has received, can only be analyzed in future.
However, structuring a new species of equity transactions that is
compatible in the conventional financial markets would inevitably
require adherence to the norms of corporate governance in its
conventional and Islamic sense.
Empirical evidence is crucial in regards to actual practice of the
IFS industry. The analysis should include examination of IFS
contracts and their true adherence to Islamic law injunctions, the
spirit of risk sharing, and the principles that seek to ensure fairness
and to curb exploitative, unjust tactics.
of the Shariah Supervisory Boards, and emphasizing that this system must be
understood in order to develop the IFS industry).
306. This issue is introduced recently. See Ibrahim, supra note 302.
307. See generally Hegazy, supra note 17, at 133-39 (discussing the conflicts
created when Shariah supervisory boards act both as auditors and consultants for
their institutions and noting that most financial systems now prohibit entities from
serving both roles).
308. See Haneef, supra note 286, at 60 (concluding that the IFS industry should
focus on developing profit-sharing products and expressing hope that such
products will be readily available in the future).
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In particular, the following questions may be examined: What
policies and strategies may be analyzed to improve the regulation of
the capital markets in the Muslim countries? Should Muslim
countries adopt or import laws and regulations from more developed
markets? Is such import already taking place and what are the results
of such convergence? Should Muslim countries first learn from the
experiences of East Asian markets? What tax structure is needed to
help Islamic finance integrate with conventional finance at home and
abroad? How different is the Islamic finance risk paradigm and what
issues are involved in its examination? Has Islamic finance identified
itself as a mechanism for capital flight from Muslim countries? Are
Islamic finance consumer advocacy groups important for further
growth of the Islamic finance, and what has been their role so far?
Has excess liquidity in the Middle East created a negative incentive
for long-term products, micro and entrepreneurial finance, and
related financial activities that are known to be the essence of Islamic
finance? How transparent is the process of product development?
How efficient are the Islamic-law supervisory boards in offering a
proxy for regulatory authority as quasi-regulators? Would Islamic-
law supervisory boards and their mechanisms pass the test of modern
corporate governance practices? Do Islamic legal opinions for
product development actually go beyond their scope and intrude into
the sphere customarily reserved for the exercise of juristic reasoning
under Islamic law? If so, what is the impact of such practice? How
can harmonization within the diversified realm of Islamic legal
opinion and the working of various Islamic schools be achieved?
Does a centralized Islamic-law supervisory board within each
jurisdiction offer any solution to the diversification problem? How
should Islamic countries manage the diversification risk within a
larger group of centralized supervisory boards? How will various
international jurisdictions respond to a choice of law clause in
Islamic finance transactions that seeks to enforce Islamic law? What
is the extent of contemporary Islamic finance in representing the
promise of its adherence to Islamic law?
The above issues and questions represent some of the most crucial
areas. The IFS industry is apparently struggling with these questions.
Future research and empirical examination of the above issues and
questions will help the industry facilitate integration with the
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international financial markets. Analysis of such issues was not the
focus of this Article, and should be dealt with separately in another
work.
CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates theoretical foundations of Islamic
finance and their correlation with the Islamic finance industry. In this
respect, the Article presents an overall survey of the Islamic finance
industry, Islamic-law injunctions, quasi-regulatory institutions,
financial engineering, transaction structures, and evolving practices.
The Article also highlights various areas of further research, a
comprehensive treatment of which is critical to the continuing
growth of Islamic finance in the international financial markets.
Islamic finance today appears to be competing aggressively with
conventional finance. On account of this competition, there is an
unprecedented pressure for innovation. The innovation often results
in a close approximation of conventional financial transactions. The
approximation strategy clearly suggests an intention to streamline
Islamic finance products with the conventional financial markets,
and to offer a viable alternative. However, this strategy has exposed
the Islamic finance industry to the risk of being labeled as an
industry that is encouraging tactics that circumvent Islamic law
injunctions.309 This raises serious issues of corporate governance in
the Islamic finance industry, which may not only thwart its growth
within its "captive market," but may also result in reluctant reception
in the international financial markets.
Furthermore, Islamic finance offers a great incentive for Muslim
countries to develop financial markets and bring them to a level
where they are attractive to international participants. With the help
of a macro strategy, Islamic finance could also be helpful in
promoting small and medium enterprise; micro or entrepreneurial
finance or both may lead to economic growth and development in
Muslim countries.
309. Hegazy, supra note 17, at 141-48.
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APPENDIX
STEP ONE: SETTING-UP SPV/SPC
The Sukuk Issuer
Special 
Purpose
(SPV/SPC
The actual sukuk issuer sets up
a special purpose company
("SPC"), which is bankruptcy-
remote and distances the real
issuer from the subscribers, and
SPC acts as the apparent issuer
and the trustee for the issue.
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STEP Two: TRANSFER OF ASSETS TO SPV/SPC
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The Sukuk Issuer J-------
' The Issuer sells certain
assets (usually real
estate, plants,J machinery,
- _- - --- - infrastructure project
concessions, etc.) to
Speia Pup-e SPC for $750 million,, Special Purpos'e- - for example.
Vehicle/Company f
(SPV/SPC)
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STEP THREE: LEASING ASSETS TO ISSUER
The Sukuk Issuer
cci
/" I
/ I
-- - - - - - I
SPC leases the assets to a lessee for a five
year term, for example. The lessee in most
cases has been the seller itself. The lessee
also provides an undertaking to buy the
assets after the lease period, that is, after
maturity of the sukuk.
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STEP FOUR: ESTABLISHING TRUST AND ISSUANCE OF SUKUK
SPC establishes a
trust in respect of
the assets and
issues the lease-
based sukuk to
raise $750 million
with a maturity of
five years.
,. Trading at the
f I~
secondary markets,
if any, starts taking
place after this
point onward until
maturity.
- - - - - - -
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STEP FIVE: PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTALS TO SUKUK HOLDERS
The Sukuk Issuer
Special Purpose
Vehicle/Company
(SPV/SPC)
After
sukuk
lessee
the te
lease,
Leased-Based Islamic Bonds six-m
durin(Sukuk-Al-Ijarah) the le
SPC
rental
sukuk
1I
Institutional or '
lndiidua~uk\Holder
receiving the
amount, the
e/issuer, as per
rms of the
starts paying
.onthly rentals
g the term of
ase to SPC, and
distributes the
s among the
-holders.
/
------------
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STEP SIX: REDEMPTION AND TRANSFER OF ASSETS TO ISSUER
After the five-year lease
term, SPC sells the assets
to the lessee/original seller
pursuant to its undertaking,
as mentioned above, for
$750 million.
To redeem the sukuk upon
maturity after five years,
SPC distributes $750
million among the sukuk
holders.
SPC is dissolved after it
has outlived its purpose,
that is, after expiration of
certain time following
redemption of all the
sukuk.
The Sukuk Issuer
Speci al Purpos~e
Vehicle/Company
, Leased-Based Islamic Bonds
(Sukuk-Al-ljarah)
Institutional or
- ncli~iaual 5_kuk__
Hodr
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